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Parties to the Paris Agreement can engage in voluntary cooperation and use 
internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards their national climate pledges. 
Doing so promises to lower the cost of achieving agreed climate objectives, which, in turn, 
allows countries to increase their mitigation efforts with given resources. Lower costs do 
not automatically translate into greater climate ambition, however: transfers that involve 
questionable mitigation outcomes can effectively increase overall emissions, affirming the 
need for a sound regulatory framework. As Parties negotiate guidance on the 
implementation of cooperative approaches under the Paris Agreement, they are therefore 
considering governance options to secure environmental integrity and address the question 
of overall climate ambition. But country views are far apart on central questions: of all the 
issues under negotiation to operationalize the Paris Agreement, cooperative approaches 
are the only agenda item that has not yet been agreed upon. Drawing on an analytical 
framework that incorporates economic theory and deliberative jurisprudence, practical 
case studies, and treaty interpretation, this article maps central positions of actors in the 
negotiations and evaluates relevant options included in the latest textual proposal. It 
concludes with a set of recommendations on how operational guidance can balance 
necessary safeguards for climate ambition with flexibility to contain transaction costs and 
allow for greater participation.
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INTRODUCTION 
Although the Paris Agreement does not make express reference to carbon markets,1 its Article 6 
is widely held to be the “latest incarnation of these approaches in an international climate treaty”2 
by allowing Parties to cooperate in the achievement of their Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs). Recent scholarship has suggested that such cooperation can “increase the latitude of 
Parties to scale up the ambition of their NDCs”,3 and recommended a balanced approach to the 
governance of Article 6 in order to avoid “restrictive quality or ambition requirements” that might 
“dampen incentives for cooperation”.4 By contrast, a growing body of literature has highlighted 
the potential of cooperative approaches to weaken aggregate efforts if unaccompanied by robust 
governance requirements.5 
Under the Paris Agreement Work Program (PAWP), Parties are currently engaged in 
developing operational rules and guidance for the implementation of Article 6.6 How to address 
questions of ambition and environmental integrity in the governance framework for Article 6 has 
consistently proven one of the most contentious items in these negotiations. On matters related to 
ambition, Parties and observers have voiced widely divergent preferences about the appropriate 
balance between international prescription and national flexibility. Accordingly, successive 
iterations of draft negotiating text have featured long lists of options for potential inclusion in the 
“Paris Rulebook”, reflecting the diversity and – in many cases – irreconcilability of current Party 
views as expressed in earlier submissions and statements. 
Relevant options proposed by Parties, groups of Parties, and observers fall along a 
continuum ranging from a high degree of prescriptiveness and central oversight to flexibility and 
delegation to individual Parties.7 Importantly, these options are not being negotiated in a legal 
vacuum. The mandate to elaborate guidance is enshrined in the Paris Agreement, a legally binding 
treaty, and the wording of that mandate as well as the intent of adopting Parties constrain what the 
Parties can and cannot include in operational details on Article 6. Conversely, anything Parties fail 
to agree on will likely remain within their sovereign discretion, given the permissive nature of 
international law. Resolving the tension between flexibility and prescription will need to occur 
                                                 
1  For a definition of such mechanisms and further discussion, with examples, see infra, Section II.A. 
2  ANDREW HOWARD, INCENTIVIZING MITIGATION: USING INTERNATIONAL CARBON MARKETS TO RAISE AMBITION 
6 (2018), https://www.carbon-mechanisms.de/en/publications/details/?jiko%5Bpubuid%5D=541 (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2019). 
3  MICHAEL A. MEHLING, GILBERT E. METCALF & ROBERT N. STAVINS, LINKING HETEROGENEOUS CLIMATE 
POLICIES (CONSISTENT WITH THE PARIS AGREEMENT) 35 (2017), 
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/linking-heterogeneous-climate-policies-consistent-paris-agreement 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2019). 
4  Michael A. Mehling, Gilbert E. Metcalf & Robert N. Stavins, Linking Climate Policies to Advance Global 
Mitigation, 359 SCI. 997, 998 (2018); see also Daniel M. Bodansky et al., Facilitating Linkage of Climate Policies 
Through the Paris Outcome, 16 CLIMATE POL’Y 956, 960 (2016). 
5  See infra, Section I, for references and discussion. 
6  See Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Decision 1/CP.21, para. 36, in UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the 
Parties on its Twenty-First Session, Addendum, Part 2, 2, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016) (mandates 
the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) with developing and recommending such 
guidance). 
7  Susan Biniaz, Analyzing Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the Paris Agreement along a ‘Nationally’ and ‘Internationally’ 
Determined Continuum, in MARKET MECHANISMS AND THE PARIS AGREEMENT 55, 55–56 (Robert N. Stavins & 
Robert C. Stowe eds., 2017). For examples and discussion of Party positions, see infra, Section III.C. 
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within these legal confines, warranting a careful analysis of the scope and limitations of the current 
negotiating mandate. 
In this article, the problematic tension between environmental ambition and flexibility in 
the governance of carbon trading is dissected through an analytical framework that builds on an 
established body of scholarship, and incorporates relevant insights from the practical operation of 
existing carbon markets. It begins with a survey of the theoretical literature on economic 
instruments for climate change mitigation, and focuses, in particular, on the rationale of such 
instruments, their governance requirements, and the implications of both under- and 
overregulation. Next, the article draws on experiences made with the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol and the European Union emissions trading system 
(EU ETS) to infer lessons from past regulatory choices on the appropriate balance between 
prescription and flexibility in carbon trading. 
This analytical framework is then applied to the discussion of operational guidance for Article 
6(2) of the Paris Agreement, which involves the use of internationally transferred mitigation 
outcomes (ITMOs) towards achievement of NDCs, and thus provides the normative framework 
for different variations of carbon trading across jurisdictions. To this end, the article proceeds to 
evaluate the legal mandate for guidance on Article 6(2) – as it relates to questions of ambition – 
based on the text and negotiating history of Article 6(2), and maps the positions of influential 
stakeholders on these questions to identify potential areas of convergence in the evolving 
negotiation process. Navigating within this legal and political opportunity space, the article relates 
the previous insights from theory and practice to key options currently under discussion to address 
the issue of ambition in Article 6(2) guidance, and concludes with a set of overarching principles 
that can help inform the further elaboration of cooperative approaches as negotiations progress 
towards the climate summit in Katowice and beyond. 
I. AMBITION, FLEXIBILITY, AND ARTICLE 6(2) OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement allows Parties to engage in voluntary cooperation as they 
implement their nationally determined contributions (NDCs).8 One such channel of cooperation – 
set out in Article 6(2) – involves the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes 
(ITMOs) towards achievement of NDCs. Although the provision omits explicit mention of 
markets, it “firmly anchors market mechanisms in the Paris Agreement”9 and thus harbors the 
promise of such mechanisms to lower the cost of achieving environmental policy objectives.10 In 
practice, Article 6(2) could be implemented in different ways, including direct transfers between 
governments, linkage of emissions trading systems or other mitigation policies across two or more 
                                                 
8  Paris Agreement on Climate Change, Art. 6(2), Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104. As of 1 March 2019, the 
Paris Agreement had been ratified by 185 parties, see UNFCCC, Paris Agreement: Status of Ratification, 
https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification (last visited Mar 10, 2019). 
9  BENITO MÜLLER, ARTICLE 6: MARKET APPROACHES UNDER THE PARIS AGREEMENT 7 (2018), 
https://ecbi.org/news/article-6-market-approaches-under-paris-agreement (last visited Mar. 10, 2019). 
10  For a brief discussion of carbon markets and their rationale as policy instruments for climate change mitigation, 
see infra, Section II.A.1. 
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Parties, sectoral or activity crediting mechanisms, and other forms of cooperation involving public 
or private entities, or both.11 
Typically, such cooperation will take place because emissions can be reduced at lower cost 
in the Party where the abatement occurs – the transferring Party – than in the Party acquiring the 
ITMO.12 With the compliance flexibility introduced through Article 6(2), both Parties can leverage 
the difference in abatement cost for mutual benefit: the acquiring Party is able to reduce the cost 
of meeting its pledged NDC, whereas the transferring Party will receive some form of 
compensation, usually in monetary terms.13 One estimate suggests that this ability to transfer 
mitigation outcomes across Parties can reduce the costs of global mitigation under currently 
submitted NDCs by one third by 2030, and by about a half by 2050.14 Another estimate anticipates 
even greater cost savings of between 59 and 79 percent by 2035, with the higher end of the range 
contingent on inclusion of abatement from reduced deforestation and forest degradation. 15 
Research on the economic effects of regional rather than global trading also affirms substantial 
cost savings.16 
                                                 
11  HOWARD, supra note 3, at 7–8; Andrew Howard, Voluntary Cooperation (Article 6), in THE PARIS AGREEMENT 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 178, 185 (Daniel Klein et al. eds., 2017); NICOLAS 
KREIBICH, RAISING AMBITION THROUGH COOPERATION: USING ARTICLE 6 TO BOLSTER CLIMATE CHANGE 
MITIGATION 7–8 (2018), https://www.carbon-mechanisms.de/en/publications/details/?jiko%5Bpubuid%5D=533 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2019); NICOLAS KREIBICH & WOLFGANG OBERGASSEL, NEW PATHS TO POLICY CREDITING? 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF POLICY-BASED COOPERATION UNDER ARTICLE 6 OF THE PARIS 
AGREEMENT 4 (2018), 
https://epub.wupperinst.org/frontdoor/deliver/index/docId/7205/file/7205_Policy_Crediting.pdf; MEHLING, 
METCALF, & STAVINS, supra note 4, at 2. 
12  As MÜLLER, supra note 10, at 14, explains, the Parties involved in Art. 6.2 transfers have been designated in 
different ways in the draft negotiating texts, with Parties transferring ITMOs out of their jurisdiction variously 
referred to as “host Parties”, “generating Parties”, “originating Parties”, or “transferring Parties”, while those 
receiving them have been referred to as “acquiring Parties” or “using Parties.”  
13  Exceptions may exist when cooperation is motivated by political rather than economic considerations, for instance 
to build capacity and channel climate finance to developing country Parties. Likewise, compensation may be 
effected in non-monetary terms, for instance through the transfer of technology or a political concession in another 
issue area, such as international trade in goods and services. 
14  WORLD BANK, ECOFYS & VIVID ECONOMICS, STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2016 80 (2016). For 2030, 
the calculation was based on INDCs available at the time, with estimated cost savings – measured as economy-
wide welfare changes when comparing a business-as-usual evolution of the energy system with an evolution 
where emissions are constrained in line with the INDC pledges – amounting to around US$ 115 billion per year. 
For 2050, the calculation assumes convergence of global per capita emissions in line with limiting global warming 
to 2°C in 2100, yielding estimated cost savings from trading of around 54 percent, or US$ 3,940 billion per year. 
Overall, this results in cumulative discounted savings in mitigation costs, using a 5 percent discount rate, of US$ 
6(2) trillion between 2012 and 2050, see Id., at 83, 86. 
15  ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND (EDF), CATALYZING CARBON MARKETS GLOBALLY TO REALIZE THE PROMISE 
OF PARIS: THE POWER OF MARKETS TO INCREASE AMBITION 2–3 (2018), 
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/236_Talanoa%20submission%20carbon%20markets%20potential
%20EDF%20April%203.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2019). For this estimate, the authors compared expected total 
global costs for meeting currently pledged NDCs from 2020 to 2035 based on their existing use of markets and 
estimates of current sectoral plans and policies, with expected costs in a variety of scenarios including domestic 
and international emissions trading, with and without use of credits from Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation (REDD) activities. 
16  BARAN DODA, SIMON QUEMIN & LUCA TASCHINI, LINKING PERMIT MARKETS MULTILATERALLY (2018), 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/cec/wpaper/1804.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2019); applying a general model to quantify 
the economic gains of multilateral linking, the authors find that emissions trading between the power sectors in 
Canada, continental Europe, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States generates gains of up to 
US$ 370 million per year relative to autarky. 
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Such cost reductions, in turn, can allow for greater climate ambition with available 
resources. By helping to achieve initial NDCs more easily, the ability to transfer mitigation effort 
can lower political resistance to more ambitious pledges in the future, and unlock additional 
resources that can be diverted to mitigation activities. As the Special Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on Global Warming of 1.5°C underscored, 
the pace and scale of mitigation efforts needed to achieve the temperature goals of the Paris 
Agreement 17  have “no documented historic precedent”, and call for unparalleled levels of 
investment.18 Because financial resources are limited, it is doubtful whether these investment 
levels can be met; assessments of current financial flows certainly affirm a considerable investment 
shortfall.19 Any policy approach that strengthens the impact of a given level of investment may, 
therefore, prove critical to narrow the considerable ambition gap of existing NDCs.20 
By leveraging the cost savings from cooperation, countries could accelerate the progression 
of their mitigation pledges across NDC cycles. One modeling assessment suggests that global use 
of carbon markets would help achieve almost twice the emission reductions at the same total cost.21 
Another estimate considers the cost savings from international carbon trading to be sufficient for 
an additional 1.5 GtCO2 of emissions abated by 2030.
22 Overall, international cooperation under 
Article 6 thus has the potential of becoming “a powerful tool to promote more mitigation action 
… and pave the way for progress within the next NDC cycle”.23 
Lower costs may not automatically translate into greater ambition, however.24 A growing 
body of research has discussed the potential of cooperative approaches to weaken aggregate efforts 
if Parties transfer ITMOs with questionable integrity or are discouraged from progressively 
                                                 
17  See Paris Agreement, Art. 2(1), supra, note 8, which states as its objective “to strengthen the global response to 
the threat of climate change … by (a) [h]olding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C 
above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial 
levels.” 
18  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5OC: AN IPCC SPECIAL 
REPORT ON THE IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C ABOVE PRE-INDUSTRIAL LEVELS AND RELATED 
GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION PATHWAYS, IN THE CONTEXT OF STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL RESPONSE 
TO THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND EFFORTS TO ERADICATE POVERTY 4–
8, SPM-29 (2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15 (last visited Mar. 10, 2019).In the energy sector alone, the IPCC 
estimates that average supply-side investment needs to achieve the 1.5°C and 2°C temperature objectives amount 
to 3-3.5 trillion per year in 2010 US$ between 2016 and 2050, see Id., at 4–13. 
19  BARBARA BUCHNER ET AL., GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF CLIMATE FINANCE 2017 14 (2017), 
https://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-landscape-of-climate-finance-2017 (last visited Mar. 10, 
2019). 
20  UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP), THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2017: A UN ENVIRONMENT 
SYNTHESIS REPORT 1 (2017). As the report observes, current NDCs are “far from the level of ambition required 
for an emissions pathway consistent with staying below a 2°C, let alone a 1.5°C, temperature increase” and 
currently cover “only around one third of the emission reductions needed by 2030”, Id., at 1. 
21  ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND (EDF), supra note 16, at 3. Using a partial-equilibrium model based on 
estimated marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves for major sectors within each country and region, and holding 
total discounted abatement cost constant, the authors estimated cumulative emissions reductions over the period 
2020 to 2035 would increase from 77 GtCO2e in the base case to 147 GtCO2e in a scenario with full global 
emissions trading, reflecting an increase of 91 percent. 
22  WORLD BANK, ECOFYS, & VIVID ECONOMICS, supra note 15, at 86. For this estimate, the authors calculated the 
mitigation effect of diverting US$ 115 billion in cost savings to abatement activities. 
23  Malin Ahlberg, Enhancing Ambition: Carbon Pricing as a Tool to Step up Mitigation Efforts, 6 CARBON 
MECHANISMS REV. 22, 23–24 (2018). 
24  HOWARD, supra note 3, at 3. 
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strengthening their NDCs over time.25 While it tends to concede the possibility of cost savings,26 
this research is more preoccupied with the risks that could arise from deployment of carbon trading, 
often with reference to examples from existing carbon markets. What the individual studies – a 
vast majority of which have been commissioned or funded by government agencies in only three 
European countries27 – collectively affirm is the need for robust governance to address such risks, 
usually accompanied by conceptual proposals and policy options that should be included in a 
regulatory framework.28 
Concerns about the environmental risks of ITMO transfers were also on the minds of 
Parties when they negotiated the Paris Agreement. Article 6(1) notes that use of cooperative 
approaches allows “for higher ambition” and serves to promote “environmental integrity.” Article 
6(2) goes further when it states that Parties using ITMOs towards their NDCs “shall … ensure 
environmental integrity and transparency, including in governance.” Based on the options included 
in the latest textual proposals, at least some of these concerns will also be addressed by the 
operational guidance on Article 6(2) that is currently under negotiation. A survey of Party positions 
in the negotiating process reveals considerable disagreement, however, on the interpretation of 
                                                 
25  HOWARD, supra note 3; KREIBICH, supra note 12; NICOLAS KREIBICH & LUKAS HERMWILLE, ROBUST TRANSFERS 
OF MITIGATION OUTCOMES - UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY CHALLENGES (2018), 
https://www.carbon-
mechanisms.de/en/publications/details/?jiko%5Bpubuid%5D=464&cHash=8376aade6adae596956280f7bdc3bd
da (last visited Mar. 10, 2019); STEPHANIE LA HOZ THEUER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS UNDER ARTICLE 
6 IN THE CONTEXT OF DIVERSE AMBITION OF NDCS: ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY RISKS AND OPTIONS TO 
ADDRESS THEM (2017), https://www.sei.org/publications/international-transfers-article-6-ndcs (last visited Mar. 
10, 2019); AXEL MICHAELOWA & SONJA BUTZENGEIGER, ENSURING ADDITIONALITY UNDER ART. 6 OF THE PARIS 
AGREEMENT: SUGGESTIONS FOR MODALITIES AND PROCEDURES FOR CREDITING OF MITIGATION UNDER ART. 6.2 
AND 6.4 AND PUBLIC CLIMATE FINANCE PROVISION UNDER ART. 6.8 (2017), 
https://www.perspectives.cc/fileadmin/Publications/Ensuring_additionality_under_Art._6_of_the_Paris_agreem
ent_Michaelowa_Axel__Butzengeiger_Sonja_2017.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2019); LAMBERT SCHNEIDER ET 
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY UNDER ARTICLE 6 OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT. (2017), 
https://www.dehst.de/SharedDocs/downloads/EN/project-mechanisms/Discussion-
Paper_Environmental_integrity.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2019); Lambert Schneider & Stephanie La Hoz Theuer, 
Environmental Integrity of International Carbon Market Mechanisms Under the Paris Agreement, 19 CLIMATE 
POL’Y 386 (2019); RANDALL SPALDING-FECHER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY AND ADDITIONALITY IN 
THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT CREDITING MECHANISMS (2017), 
https://www.energimyndigheten.se/contentassets/2600659ecfa54ec995b835a4c99d75fb/environmental-
integrity----final-report-2017.01.24.pdf; CARSTEN WARNECKE ET AL., OPPORTUNITIES AND SAFEGUARDS FOR 
AMBITION RAISING THROUGH ARTICLE 6 (2018), https://newclimate.org/2018/05/09/opportunities-and-
safeguards-for-ambition-raising-through-article-6 (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
26  Interestingly, the potential for cost savings under Art. 6 is usually affirmed, without offering any supporting 
evidence or references; see e.g. HOWARD, supra note 3, at 3: “The case for international carbon markets being 
cost-effective in mitigating climate change is well established.” 
27  SANDRA GREINER & AXEL MICHAELOWA, COOPERATIVE APPROACHES UNDER ART. 6.2 OF THE PARIS 
AGREEMENT (2018), https://climatefocus.com/publications/cooperative-approaches-under-art-62-paris-
agreement (last visited Mar. 11, 2019); HOWARD, supra note 3; KREIBICH, supra note 12; KREIBICH & 
HERMWILLE, supra note 26; MICHAELOWA & BUTZENGEIGER, supra note 26; and WARNECKE ET AL., supra note 
26, acknowledge the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety as 
client or sponsor; LA HOZ THEUER ET AL., supra note 26; and Stephanie La Hoz Theuer, Lambert Schneider & 
Derik Broekhoff, When Less Is More: Limits to International Transfers Under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, 
19 CLIMATE POL’Y 401 (2019), acknowledge the Belgian Directorate-General Environment, under the authority 
of the Federal Public Service Health, Food Chain Safety and Environment, as client or sponsor; SPALDING-
FECHER ET AL., supra note 26, acknowledge the Swedish Energy Agency as client or sponsor. 
28  For examples and discussion in the context of individual negotiation issues, see infra, Section 2. 
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these concepts and how they should be reflected – if at all – in relevant guidance.29 What emerges 
from the mapping of Party statements and submissions is a range of views along a continuum 
between prescription and flexibility, inviting questions about the appropriate balance.30 
This challenge is not new, of course. Ever since market approaches have been discussed in 
the international climate regime, some stakeholders have endorsed simplicity and speed in their 
operationalization, while others have placed greater emphasis on the need to secure environmental 
integrity and ambition.31 Each viewpoint can cite reasonable arguments, and any compromise will, 
by necessity, incur a number of tradeoffs. A highly prescriptive governance framework can 
increase transaction costs to the point of stifling investor interest and exceeding the technical and 
administrative capacity of some countries, becoming a deterrent against use of Article 6(2) and its 
ability to reduce abatement costs; regulatory flaws and lacking stringency, in turn, can result in 
ITMO transfers of questionable integrity that run counter to the mitigation objectives of the Paris 
Agreement and undermine confidence in its market mechanisms, echoing a pattern observed under 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
So how should these competing priorities be reconciled? With around half of all Parties 
signaling their intention to participate in international carbon markets, either as a source of climate 
finance or as a means to achieve pledged emission reductions,32 the importance of this question 
should not be underrated. Identifying an outcome that balances contending views and is acceptable 
to all Parties will be critical if Article 6(2) is to become, as one veteran of the negotiations has 
proposed, “the choice for up-scaled mitigation activities” to achieve the Paris Agreement objective 
of global carbon neutrality in the second half of the century.33  
Any political outcome should hence be based on a robust understanding of its implications, 
including the inevitable tradeoffs, and factor in relevant insights from the research community. So 
far, however, the literature on this complex governance challenge has been to a certain degree self-
referential, and difficult to disentangle from the viewpoints of a narrow group of countries 
commissioning or otherwise supporting the underlying research.34 While this article cannot claim 
to reflect a greater geographic diversity of views – for now, there is a dearth of research and 
analysis on Article 6 from outside Europe and North America – it aims to expand the discussion 
based on an analytical framework drawn from broader academic enquiry across economic theory 
and political economy as well as deliberative jurisprudence, described in the next section. 
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: THEORY AND CASE STUDIES 
A. Carbon Markets and their Regulation 
1. Markets, Market Failure and Corrective Intervention 
                                                 
29  For a mapping of Party positions, see infra, Section III.C. 
30  GREINER & MICHAELOWA, supra note 28, at 8. 
31  MICHAELOWA & BUTZENGEIGER, supra note 26, at 10. 
32  International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), IETA INPUT TO THE TALANOA DIALOGUE 2 (2018); WORLD 
BANK & ECOFYS, STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2018 34 (2018). 
33  Thomas Forth, Katowice and the Paris Rule Book, 6 CARBON MECHANISMS REV. 4, 6 (2018). 
34  For references, see supra, note 27. 
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To better understand the implications of alternative approaches to the governance of Article 6(2) 
and how these might affect its operation, a closer look at the theoretical underpinnings of carbon 
trading is warranted. Economic theory commonly ascribes environmental challenges to different 
market failures, caused by, inter alia, positive or negative externalities, 35  market power and 
concentration, split incentives, and information asymmetries. For economists, such market failures 
denote an inefficient allocation of goods and services by the market, justifying an intervention in 
the form of public policy.36 Policy makers seeking to address the causes and effects of climate 
change – once described as “the greatest market failure the world has ever seen”37 – can take 
recourse to a portfolio of policy instruments, including corrective pricing and quantity rationing, 
performance standards, subsidies, agreements, and informational instruments.38 
A subset of policy instruments influence behavior through price signals,39 and are therefore 
commonly referred to as market-based or economic instruments.40 Such instruments are generally 
credited with achieving climate policy objectives at the lowest cost because they incentivize 
abatement where it is cheapest. 41  Abatement decisions are decentralized, moreover, helping 
overcome the information asymmetry between policy makers and polluters. By granting polluters 
flexibility to determine the allocation of resources, these instruments are thus better at avoiding 
path dependencies and sunk investments in dead-end technologies.42 
One way of harnessing the benefits of economic instruments relies on quantity controls 
coupled with the creation of a market for tradable units.43 While guaranteeing a defined policy 
outcome, such markets also generate an explicit price, thereby internalizing some or all of the 
social cost of pollution in the private cost of underlying economic activity.44 As prices for units 
                                                 
35  James M. Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371 (1962). 
36  Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 351 (1958). Ronald H. Coase famously argued 
that no government intervention is necessary between parties affected by certain types of market failures if these 
can engage in unobstructed bargaining without transaction cost, since they could agree on a Pareto efficient 
outcome, see The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Coase himself conceded that these conditions 
are never met in practice, limiting the practical significance of his theorem, see Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional 
Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 717 (1992). 
37  NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW viii (2007). 
38  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE. WORKING GROUP III CONTRIBUTION TO THE IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT 1155 (2015); 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION: 
WHAT DO WE DO? 18–22 (2008). 
39  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: HOW TO 
APPLY ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS 117 (1991). 
40  JOHANNES B. OPSCHOOR & HANS VOS, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1989); 
Robert N. Stavins, Market-Based Environmental Policies, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
31 (Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2nd ed. 2000). 
41  Carolyn Fischer & Richard G. Newell, Environmental and Technology Policies for Climate Mitigation, 55 J. ENV. 
ECON. & MGMT. 142 (2008); PROJECT 88: HARNESSING MARKET FORCES TO PROTECT OUR ENVIRONMENT, 15, 
19 (Robert N. Stavins ed., 1988). 
42  Dieter Helm, Economic Instruments and Environmental Policy, 36 ECON. & SOC. REV. 205, 215 (2005). 
43  Thomas D Crocker, The Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems, in THE ECONOMICS OF AIR 
POLLUTION: A SYMPOSIUM 61 (Harold Wolozin ed., 1966); JOHN H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES: 
AN ESSAY IN POLICYMAKING AND ECONOMICS (1968); W. David Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient 
Pollution Control Programs, 5 J. ECON. THEORY 395 (1972). 
44  While quantity controls with trading are fundamentally distinct from Pigovian pricing set at the level of the social 
cost of externalities [see ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920)], the variable market price of 
transacted units does send a price signal to market participants, thereby internalizing the externality at least in 
part. 
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rise in response to growing scarcity, the demand for them will gradually decrease, along with the 
associated emissions. Under conditions of perfect competition, this should result in an equilibrium 
where marginal abatement costs are equalized across all regulated entities, and abatement occurs 
where it yields the largest net benefit to society.45 
Applied to climate change, this quantity rationing approach involves issuance of tradable 
units conferring the right to discharge a specified quantity of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for 
a specified duration. Variations of this approach range from emissions trading systems based on a 
technological baseline or an emissions ceiling (“cap”) to crediting systems based on mitigation 
efforts at project, sectoral or economy-wide level.46 Collectively referred to as “carbon markets”,47 
they have in common a quantity limitation which generates demand for units, and an ability of 
market participants to purchase or sell units at the respective market price, signaling the 
opportunity costs of pollution as determined by the forces of demand and supply. Cooperative 
approaches and the ability to transfer ITMO fall within this category of market-based instruments, 
explaining why Article 6 is frequently referred to as the “markets provision” of the Paris 
Agreement48 despite lacking express reference to markets. 
A market-based approach is particularly suited to address climate change because GHGs 
are not in themselves toxic and the damage function of their accumulation in the atmosphere is 
shallow in the short run,49 which allows for spatial and temporal flexibility in the policy response.50 
Climate change is unique, moreover, in that the underlying causes are diffuse, widely 
heterogeneous and virtually ubiquitous activities, necessitating policy solutions that are scalable 
and cost-effective. As abatement costs rise over time – with cheap abatement options being, by 
design, exhausted first 51  – the cost-effectiveness of market-based instruments will become 
increasingly important to sustain policy ambition over the long term, underscoring the potential 
role of Article 6(2) in the successive progression of NDCs. 
2. Markets and the Role of Governance 
While carbon markets thus offer a powerful tool to address climate change, they also place high 
demands on the institutional and regulatory architecture created for their implementation. 52 
Properly defined and enforced institutions – including property rights – are necessary for any 
                                                 
45  WILLIAM J BAUMOL & WALLACE E OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 177 (2nd ed. 1988); 
THOMAS H TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 27 (2nd ed. 2006). 
46  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), DOMESTIC TRANSFERABLE 
PERMITS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 19 (2001). 
47  Although other greenhouse gases may be included, the term “carbon market” is widely used because carbon 
dioxide (CO2) is the main GHG in terms of its overall contribution to climate change, and because tradable units 
are mostly denominated in terms of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e), see Richard G. Newell, William A. Pizer 
& Daniel Raimi, Carbon Markets 15 Years after Kyoto: Lessons Learned, New Challenges, 27 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 123, 124 (2013). 
48  MARTIN CAMES ET AL., INTERNATIONAL MARKET MECHANISMS AFTER PARIS 7 (2016), 
https://www.dehst.de/SharedDocs/downloads/EN/project-
mechanisms/International_market_mech_after_Paris_discussion_paper.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
49  This is the case because climate change is a stock externality: its consequences depend not on emissions in a 
single year, but on the accumulated stock of emissions over time, see Newell and Pizer (2003): 417. 
50  Helm, supra note 43, at 223; Alan J. Krupnick & Ian W.H. Parry, What Is the Best Policy Instrument for Reducing 
CO2 Emissions?, in FISCAL POLICY TO MITIGATE CLIMATE CHANGE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 1, 1 (Ruud de 
Mooij, Michael Keen, & Ian W.H. Parry eds., 2012). 
51  STERN, supra note 38, at 63, 191. 
52  Ruth Greenspan Bell, The Kyoto Placebo, 22 ISSUES. SCI. & TECH. 28, 29 (2006). 
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market to achieve efficient outcomes,53 especially where they affect public goods and common-
pool resources.54 Like other markets,55 carbon markets are therefore embedded in and facilitated 
by government regulation.56 Because they are premised on an artificially constrained supply of 
emission units, however, they are particularly dependent on a robust governance framework and 
credible policy mandates. 
At a minimum, carbon markets require a process to ensure transparency of emissions, 
including a regulatory framework for measurement, reporting and verification (MRV), as well as 
the required infrastructure to track distribution and ownership of assigned and transacted units.57 
Establishing such structures is critical, yet frequently constrained by insufficient technical and 
administrative capacities, including resources and suitable personnel. 58  Different jurisdictions 
show great variation in their legal and administrative systems, their regulatory cultures, and their 
traditions of transparency, accountability, and access to information, likewise affecting the 
operation of carbon markets.59 As the conceptual notion of carbon trading moves from theory to 
implementation, its elegant simplicity gives way to complex governance challenges. 
These are all the more relevant because incentive structures in carbon markets differ 
fundamentally from those in more established markets: buyers and sellers can afford indifference 
about whether transacted units reflect actual emission reductions, making evasion a positive sum 
game for both parties. Absent adequate safeguards, the intangible nature and limited, inelastic 
supply of emission units renders carbon markets relatively more susceptible to price volatility and 
strategic or fraudulent behavior.60 Such risks to market integrity have prompted extensive debate 
about governance requirements, including the role of financial market regulation and its extension 
to carbon market governance.61 
                                                 
53  Coase, supra note 37. 
54  ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 15 
(1990); on the typology of goods, see Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. 
& STAT. 387 (1954). 
55  MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 364 (3rd ed. 1947). 
56  Markus Lederer, Market Making Via Regulation: The Role of the State in Carbon Markets, 6 REG. & 
GOVERNANCE 524 (2012). 
57  SUZI KERR ET AL., EMISSIONS TRADING IN PRACTICE: A HANDBOOK ON DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION (2016), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/353821475849138788/Emissions-trading-in-practice-a-handbook-
on-design-and-implementation (last visited Mar. 11, 2019); ERIK F. HAITES & GEOFFREY BIRD, AN EMERGING 
MARKET FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: A GUIDE TO EMISSIONS TRADING (2002). 
58  Thomas L. Brewer & Michael A. Mehling, Transparency of Climate Change Policies, Markets, and Corporate 
Practices, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL TRANSPARENCY 179, 188 (2014). 
59  RUTH GREENSPAN BELL, CHOOSING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN THE REAL WORLD 11 (2003), 
http://www.oecd.org/environment/cc/2957706.pdf; with specific examples for China: Coraline Goron & Cyril 
Cassisa, Regulatory Institutions and Market-Based Climate Policy in China, 17 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 99 (2016). 
60  Beat Hintermann, Market Power, Permit Allocation and Efficiency in Emission Permit Markets, 49 ENVTL. & 
RES. ECON. 327, 327 (2011); William D. Nordhaus, After Kyoto: Alternative Mechanisms to Control Global 
Warming, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 31, 33–34 (2006); generally Robert W. Hahn, Market Power and Transferable 
Property Rights, 99 Q. J. ECON. 753 (1984). In an earlier version of his article, Nordhaus even went so far as to 
say that “cheating will probably be pandemic in an emissions trading system that involves large sums of money”, 
see id., LIFE AFTER KYOTO: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO GLOBAL WARMING 19 (2005), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11889 (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
61  JONAS MONAST, JON ANDA & TIMOTHY H. PROFETA, U.S. CARBON MARKET DESIGN: REGULATING EMISSION 
ALLOWANCES AS FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS (2009), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/climate/carbon-market-
oversight/u.s.-carbon-market-design-regulating-emission-allowances-as-financial-instruments (last visited Feb. 
12, 2019); WILLIAM C. WHITESELL & STACEY L. DAVIS, PREVENTING MARKET DISRUPTIONS IN CAP-AND-TRADE 
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Another challenge arising from the unique incentive structure of carbon markets are 
intertemporal – or dynamic – inefficiencies discussed in the theoretical literature,62 including in 
the context of emissions trading63 and offset crediting.64 Applied to Article 6, such inefficiencies 
would translate into a perverse incentive for Parties to weaken the ambition of their future climate 
pledges. Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement requires all Parties to participate in 
mitigation, altering the incentive structure for countries as they consider future climate pledges. A 
central feature of the Paris Agreement is its NDC cycle, which requires Parties to update their 
NDC every five years, ensuring a progression beyond the current NDC and reflecting “the highest 
possible level of ambition.”65 By offering the prospect of profitable transfers, Article 6 might 
induce Parties to adopt less ambitious targets in order to reserve a greater share of mitigation 
opportunities for eventual transfers under Article 6. 66  Implementing regulatory safeguards to 
counter such a dynamic will be one of the most challenging and contested aspects of 
operationalizing Article 6. 
3. Government Failure and the Limits of Regulation 
As will be described in the next section,67 several of these vulnerabilities have already been 
observed in practice, with harmful effects for the functioning of carbon markets and their support 
among market participants and the broader public. This latter observation mirrors the experience 
in other markets, where under-regulation has proven detrimental and ultimately prompted calls for 
regulatory reform from market participants themselves.68 Yet while the economic benefits of 
market-based instruments are predicated on an adequate governance framework, excessive 
regulation can prove equally detrimental. Just as market failures call for regulatory intervention to 
secure the conditions needed for an efficient allocation of resources, regulation that exceeds the 
level needed to correct those market failures will counteract the allocative efficiency achieved 
through corrective measures. 
Regulatory intervention into the operation of markets raises questions that go beyond the 
appropriate level of such intervention, and also include the quality and objectives of intervention. 
In the literature, such questions have been discussed under the broader label of non-market or 
government failures, including cognitive, organizational, and political barriers. 69  Like other 
                                                 
PROGRAMS (2008), http://ccap.org/assets/Preventing-Market-Disruptions-in-Cap-and-Trade-Programs_CCAP-
Oct-2008.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
62  BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 46, at 212. 
63  Jared C. Carbone, Carsten Helm & Thomas F. Rutherford, The Case for International Emission Trade in the 
Absence of Cooperative Climate Policy, 58 J. ENV. ECON. & MGMT. 266 (2009); Carsten Helm, International 
Emissions Trading with Endogenous Allowance Choices, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 2737 (2003); Bjart Holtsmark & Dag 
Einar Sommervoll, International Emissions Trading: Good or Bad?, 117 ECON. LETTERS 362 (2012). 
64  Jon Strand, Carbon Offsets with Endogenous Environmental Policy, 33 ENERGY ECON. 371 (2011). 
65  See Paris Agreement, supra, note 8, Art. 4: “2. Each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive 
nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve. … 3. Each Party’s successive nationally determined 
contribution will represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution and 
reflect its highest possible ambition. … 9. Each Party shall communicate a nationally determined contribution 
every five years.” 
66  HOWARD, supra note 3, at 6. 
67  See infra, Section II.B. 
68  Joseph E. Stiglitz, Government Failure vs. Market Failure: Principles of Regulation, in GOVERNMENT AND 
MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 13, 15 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2012). 
69  Michael C. O’Dowd, The Problem of “Government Failure” In Mixed Economies, 46 S. AFRICAN J. ECON. 242 
(1978); GORDON TULLOCK, GORDON L. BRADY & ARTHUR SELDON, GOVERNMENT FAILURE: A PRIMER IN 
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climate policies, for instance, carbon markets are exposed to rent seeking and regulatory capture 
at various stages of their implementation, but their technical complexity arguably expands the 
number of entry points for influencing behavior.70 More generally, governments tend to suffer 
from information asymmetries and capacity constraints that limit their ability to identify and 
implement the most appropriate intervention. 71  It has even been argued that climate change 
stretches the capability of governments to process and react to the attendant information.72 As a 
result of these various factors, policy makers face considerable difficulties in identifying the 
optimal balance between too much or too little regulation, and any balance they might strike will 
in turn be subject to political pressures and stakeholder influences. 
Even where these cognitive, organizational and political barriers could be overcome, some 
commentators have gone further and questioned the altruistic motivations of government actors to 
intervene in the public interest. 73  Contested arguments of this sort do not require further 
elaboration here; it suffices to acknowledge that regulation, like markets, suffers from its own 
failures. In the practical operation of carbon markets, such failures can manifest themselves in 
several ways. Stakeholder pressures can weaken the stringency of mitigation targets or influence 
the design of carbon markets in ways that favor certain market participants.74 Conversely, policy 
makers may err on the side of caution, and opt for excessive regulation that contributes to high 
transaction costs. Transaction costs can significantly affect the operation of carbon markets,75 
diminishing liquidity and the efficiency of price discovery. Where individual transactions require 
prior government approval, they can also discourage trading.76 Overly stringent restrictions can 
deter market actors from participating in the market altogether.77 
Overall, thus, reconciling contending visions of the appropriate balance between 
prescriptiveness and flexibility, or between securing ambition and reducing cost, encompasses 
inevitable normative and economic tradeoffs. Theoretical enquiry can only go so far in offering 
guidance for what ultimately remains a political question, but it does provide useful reminders of 
the rationale of market mechanisms, the need for and limitations of governance, and the trade-offs 
inherent to different political choices. These insights will be revisited in the interim conclusions in 
                                                 
PUBLIC CHOICE (2002); Burton Allen Weisbrod, Problems of Enhancing the Public Interest: Toward a Model of 
Governmental Failures, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 30 (Burton 
Allen Weisbrod, Joel F. Handler, & Neil K. Komesar eds., 1978); CHARLES WOLF JR., MARKETS OR 
GOVERNMENTS: CHOOSING BETWEEN IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (2nd ed. 1993). 
70  JONAS MECKLING, CARBON COALITIONS: BUSINESS, CLIMATE POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF EMISSIONS TRADING 
(2011); on the concepts, see James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, Polluters’ Profits and Political Response: Direct 
Controls Versus Taxes, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 139 (1975); Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-
Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL 
J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI 3 (1971). 
71  FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: RULE AND ORDER 14 (1973); BRIAN E. DOLLERY 
& JOE L. WALLIS, MARKET FAILURE, GOVERNMENT FAILURE, LEADERSHIP AND PUBLIC POLICY 37 (1999). 
72  Max H. Bazerman, Climate Change as a Predictable Surprise, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 179 (2006). 
73  HA-JOON CHANG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 33 (1996); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN 
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 136 (1957); TULLOCK, BRADY, & SELDON, supra note 70, at 10. 
74  Peter Markussen & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, Industry Lobbying and the Political Economy of GHG Trade in 
the European Union, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 245 (2005); Irja Vormedal, The Influence of Business and Industry NGOs 
in the Negotiation of the Kyoto Mechanisms: The Case of Carbon Capture and Storage in the CDM, 8 GLOBAL 
ENVTL. POL. 36 (2008). 
75  Robert N. Stavins, Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits, 29 J. ENV. ECON. & MGMT. 133 (1995). 
76  Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA’s Emissions Trading 
Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109 (1989). 
77  NORDHAUS, supra note 61, at 18. 
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Section II.C., but their manifestation in practice is first tested against two case studies of existing 
carbon markets: the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, and the European Union 
Emissions Trading System, in the next subsection. 
B. Case Studies: Experiences with Carbon Markets 
1. Kyoto Protocol Flexibility Mechanisms 
Under the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, an international treaty adopted in 1997, 78  those 
developed country Parties that entered quantified emission limitation and reduction obligations 
(QELROs) during the first commitment period from 2008 to 2012 were able to meet these through 
a set of flexibility mechanisms: international emissions trading and two project mechanisms, Joint 
Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).79 A subsequent amendment 
to the Kyoto Protocol, adopted in Doha in 2012, defines the parameters of a second commitment 
period for the period between 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2020. Although this amendment has 
yet to enter into force, the few Kyoto Parties with QELROs participating in the second commitment 
period have collectively agreed to reduce GHG emissions by at least 18 percent below 1990 
levels.80 
Largely adopted in response to pressure from a group of advanced economies, 81  the 
flexibility mechanisms were included in the Kyoto Protocol to help lower the cost of compliance 
with mitigation commitments by leveraging the differences in abatement costs between developed 
and developing countries. 82  Although the relevant provisions of the Kyoto Protocol set out 
considerably more operational detail than Article 6(2) of the Paris Agreement, even creating a new 
supervisory body – the CDM Executive Board (CDM EB) – they still mandated Parties with 
subsequent elaboration of additional modalities, procedures, and guidelines. Such implementing 
rules were eventually adopted in 2001 as part of the Marrakesh Accords, a series of decisions that 
govern implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.83 
Under these rules, use of the flexibility mechanisms is voluntary, but subject to several 
eligibility requirements. To participate in international emissions trading, for instance, countries 
must have calculated their assigned emission budgets pursuant to specified accounting modalities, 
                                                 
78  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 
162; as of 1 March 2019, the Kyoto Protocol remains in effect for 192 states, see UNFCCC, The Kyoto Protocol: 
Status of Ratification, https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol/status-of-ratification (last visited Mar 1, 
2019). 
79  Occasionally, joint fulfilment of commitments pursuant to Art. 4 of the Kyoto Protocol has also been counted 
towards the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. For details, see David Freestone, UNFCCC, the Kyoto 
Protocol, and the Kyoto Mechanisms, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK 3 (David Freestone & Charlotte Streck eds., 2005). 
80  See Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to its Article 3, Paragraph 9 (the Doha Amendment), Decision 
1/CMP.8, in UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol on its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1 (Feb. 28, 2013). 
81  Joanna Depledge, TRACING THE ORIGINS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: AN ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE TEXTUAL 
HISTORY 61–68 (2000). 
82  Lawrence H. Goulder & Brian M. Nadreau, International Approaches to Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY 115, 122–125 (Stephen H. Schneider, Armin Rosencranz, & John O. 
Niles eds., 2nd ed. 2002). 
83  Suraje Dessai & Emma Lisa Schipper, The Marrakech Accords to the Kyoto Protocol: Analysis and Future 
Prospects, 13 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 149 (2003). 
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established a national system for the estimation of GHG emissions by sources and removals by 
sinks, and created the necessary infrastructure to account for the issuance, holding, transfer, 
cancellation and retirement of tradable units.84 Annual submission of an accurate inventory is a 
key eligibility requirement,85 as is maintenance of a “commitment period reserve” limiting the 
share of tradable units Parties may sell to ten per cent of their respective assigned amount.86 
Compliance with these requirements is assessed through an independent review process, and 
failure to observe relevant obligations can result in sanctions, such as exclusion from the use of 
the flexibility mechanisms.87  
Activity under the emissions trading system was limited.88 One explanation for this limited 
uptake is that sovereign states are not motivated by cost-minimization or profit-maximization to 
the same extent private actors are, and instead tend to be driven by geopolitical and diplomatic 
considerations.89 Limited market participation reduces liquidity and can increase opportunities for 
market manipulation. Discussing the importance of actors other than countries with compliance 
obligations, a contemporary observer of the international carbon market also noted that enhanced 
participation enhances the “likelihood that the price signal generated by trading is a reliable 
indicator for investment decisions”. If proven true, this observation has considerable relevance for 
Article 6 and discussions about potential participation restrictions, including exclusions of Non-
state Actors (or non-Party Stakeholders), that is, subnational and private entities, from participation 
in the market.90  
Much greater levels of market activity have been seen under JI and the CDM, which also 
have allowed for extensive involvement of the private sector. Both are subject to a separate set of 
rules from international emissions trading, reflecting their fundamentally different nature as 
project mechanisms that yield offset credits. Under both mechanisms, projects must satisfy an 
“additionality” test, demonstrating that the emission reductions would not have taken place without 
the project.91 Projects must result in emission reductions that go beyond a baseline scenario and 
result in real, measurable, and lasting climate benefits.92 This reliance on a counterfactual baseline 
                                                 
84  See Kyoto Protocol, Arts. 3(7), 3(8), and 5(1); Modalities, Rules and Guidelines for Emissions Trading under 
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, Decision 18/CP.7, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh 
Session, Addendum, Part Two, 50, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002); and Modalities for 
Accounting of Assigned Amounts under Article 7, Paragraph 4, of the Kyoto Protocol, Decision 19/CP.7, Annex, 
in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Addendum, Part Two, 55, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002). 
85  See Kyoto Protocol, Art. 7(1); Guidance for the Preparation of the Information Required under Article 7 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, Decision 22/CP.7, Annex, paras. 3(a) to 3(f), in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
Seventh Session, Addendum, Part Two, 50, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002). 
86  See The Bonn Agreements on the Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, Decision 5/CP.6, in Report 
of the Conference of the Parties on the Second Part of its Sixth Session, 15, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/5 (Sept. 
25, 2001). 
87  Farhana Yamin, The International Rules on the Kyoto Mechanisms, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND CARBON MARKETS: 
A HANDBOOK OF EMISSIONS REDUCTION MECHANISMS 1, 61–67 (Farhana Yamin ed., 2005). 
88  Igor Shishlov, Romain Morel & Valentin Bellassen, Compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the first 
commitment period, 16 CLIMATE POL’Y 768, 778 (2016). 
89  ROBERT W. HAHN & ROBERT N. STAVINS, WHAT HAS THE KYOTO PROTOCOL WROUGHT? 9 (1999). 
90  See relevant proposals discussed infra, in Section III.C.2. 
91  Peter Erickson, Michael Lazarus & Randall Spalding-Fecher, Net Climate Change Mitigation of the Clean 
Development Mechanism, 72 ENERGY POL’Y 146 (2014). 
92  See, e.g., Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism, as Defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto 
Protocol, Decision 17/CP.7, Annex, para. 44, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, 
Addendum, Part Two, 20, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002), and Guidelines for the 
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scenario has been contested, as it involves predicting future energy consumption patterns, fuel 
prices, and energy policies, all of which presupposes highly subjective assumptions.93 With both 
parties to a mitigation project standing to benefit from its implementation, moreover, they share 
an incentive to overstate actual emission reductions.94 
Particular concerns have been voiced against the CDM, which involves emission reduction 
projects in developing countries without mitigation commitments of their own under the Kyoto 
Protocol. Reflecting such concerns, the Marrakech Accords set out a highly detailed procedure to 
determine the additionality of proposed mitigation projects. Under these rules, development and 
approval of CDM projects require evaluation and registration by the CDM EB, as well as 
independent project validation, verification and certification of reductions by accredited 
Designated Operational Entities (DOEs).95 
Transaction costs resulting from this elaborate process have been considerable, 
disproportionately impacting smaller emission reduction projects.96 Despite more relaxed rules for 
the smaller projects prevalent in least developed countries, these transaction costs have influenced 
the geographic distribution of investment from poorer regions.97 Of the roughly 8,000 registered 
CDM projects to date, for instance, only about 3% are located in African countries,98 where more 
diffuse emission patterns and generally challenging investment conditions have further 
exacerbated this uneven project distribution.99 Coupled with a bias for large industrial projects,100 
the strong regional dominance of Asian countries – and above all China – in hosting projects has 
prevented the CDM from realizing its separate objective of assisting developing countries in 
achieving sustainable development.101 Also, the average time to progress from project validation 
to registration, monitoring, and issuance of credits has been around 36 months, with a rising 
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tendency in recent years.102 Unsurprisingly, stakeholders have complained that the CDM approval 
process is “unclear, impractical, and resource intensive,” suggesting that the regulatory framework 
“discouraged investment in the kinds of projects that would have the most benefits” without 
“necessarily result[ing] in a higher quality of credits”.103  
In effect, CDM procedures have been shown to suffer from various forms of regulatory 
failure. Documented shortfalls in the quality of critical validation and certification functions 
performed by DOEs prompted scrutiny and resulted in the suspension of accreditations. 104 
Recurring instances of collusion between supposedly independent actors, such as project 
developers, national approval authorities (DNAs), and even the supervisory CDM EB itself, 
invited accusations of flawed governance and outright fraud. 105  Likewise, the design and 
operationalization of the CDM has evidenced susceptibility to regulatory capture by 
stakeholders.106 With up to a third of expected credits never generated and another third only 
delivered with significant delays, the CDM process has also manifested considerable project risk 
for developers.107 
Soon after the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, moreover, several independent studies 
suggested that a considerable share of registered projects lacked additionality108 or incentivized 
production of industrial GHGs in order to decompose them.109 Such research quickly garnered 
attention in the mainstream media,110 and undermined public support for the CDM, which in turn 
pressured governments to introduce restrictions on the acceptance of CERs.111 Notwithstanding a 
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documented ability to dramatically reduce the cost of achieving mitigation commitments,112 the 
market for CERs subsequently suffered a dramatic decline. Within the space of a few years, CER 
prices fell 98% from previous highs, at one point earning them the headline of “worst performing 
commodity”. 113  A major assessment of the CDM concluded in 2012 that the market had 
“essentially collapsed” (CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012: 67), with declining transaction volumes also 
causing a loss in institutional capacity as major market facilitators, including project developers, 
brokers, and other intermediaries, downsized their activities or ceased operations altogether (Buen, 
2013: 3). 
Overall, the experience with the CDM has been, in many ways, a cautionary one, 
evidencing how an attempt to correct a market failure has suffered from failures of its own. No 
simple answer can be inferred on the appropriate balance between regulation and flexibility. With 
the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that certain project methodologies should have been excluded 
from the outset. A cumbersome approval process has contributed to project risk and high 
transaction costs, without preventing questionable outcomes. As one veteran summarizes it, critics 
of the CDM process argue that “the testing was too complex and substantially increased 
transactions costs for project developers. Yet, it was required for safeguarding the environmental 
integrity of the mechanism”.114 At the same time, governance rules have been insufficient to deter 
market participants from undesirable and, in some cases, fraudulent behavior. 
Numerous changes have been made to reform the mechanism by closing regulatory 
loopholes, introducing greater standardization of methodologies and baselines, and streamlining 
the lengthy and bureaucratic approval process. Introduction of solid fee revenues from project 
registration and CER issuance has helped the CDM EB scale up its support staff, greatly 
accelerating the approval, registration and issuance processes.115 Still, these reforms arguably 
come too late to undo the reputational damage and unilateral restrictions that have already been 
implemented in key jurisdictions as a response to the perceived shortcomings of the CDM.116 
Coinciding with historically low demand for CERs, these reforms are unlikely to an ailing 
market.117 What is more, the improvements they introduce may still be insufficient to prevent 
CDM projects with questionable additionality.118 What they highlight, however, is the dynamic 
nature of carbon market mechanisms and their governance frameworks: no design is final, and 
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growing experience with the operation of the market as well as changing circumstances will 
necessitate amendments and revisions over time.119 
Information asymmetries, regulatory capture, and other dynamics discussed in the previous 
section 120  have contributed to the challenges experienced with the CDM, undermining its 
efficiency and possibly accelerating its dramatic demise. Importantly, however, the empirical track 
record seems to refute concerns that the CDM would incentivize host countries to weaken domestic 
climate policy trajectories, be it because they seek to improve their attractiveness for investors or 
because developed countries already harvested all attractive mitigation options. 121  Rather, 
empirical data, surveys, and case studies suggest that an abundance of affordable abatement 
options, the collateral benefits of many climate policies, and the raised public and institutional 
awareness of climate issues in host countries have outweighed any such negative incentives, while 
other domestic factors – including economic priorities and institutional power structures – have 
played a much greater role than carbon finance in driving the adoption of climate and energy 
policies.122 If anything, the geographic and sectoral concentration of projects has provided strong 
evidence for the ability of private sector actors to identify and harness low cost abatement 
opportunities.123  
Notwithstanding the various challenges encountered in the implementation of the market 
mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, it bears noting that all Parties with QELROs have fully 
complied with their mitigation obligations during the first commitment period.124 During that 
period, the flexibility mechanisms collectively mobilized in excess of US$140 billion in climate 
finance, a vast majority of which went to developing countries, and a good share of which was 
invested in Green Investment Schemes (GIS) as a means of advancing sustainable development 
and other social and environmental benefits. 125  For some Parties, such as Japan, use of the 
flexibility mechanisms proved essential to meet their committed emission reductions,126 validating 
the underlying rationale of these market approaches. As the ongoing reform of the CDM regulatory 
architecture continues to unfold, questions about future demand for CERs and their eligibility 
under the Paris Agreement will need to be answered.127 
2. European Union Emissions Trading System 
                                                 
119  Newell, Pizer, & Raimi, supra note 48, at 139–140. 
120  See supra, Section II.A.3. 
121  On such concerns, see BURNIAUX ET AL., supra note 113, at 62; Cameron Hepburn, Carbon Trading: A Review 
of the Kyoto Mechanisms, 32 ANN. REV. ENVT. & RES. 375, 386 (2007). 
122  BUEN, supra note 116, at 5; Paula Castro, Does the CDM Discourage Emission Reduction Targets in Advanced 
Developing Countries?, 12 CLIMATE POL’Y 198, 212 (2012); Randall Spalding-Fecher, National Policies and 
CDM: E+, E- or Both?, 2 CARBON MECHANISMS REV. 9, 11 (2014), with further references. 
123  YOKO NOBUOKA, JANE ELLIS & SARAH PYNDT ANDERSEN, ENCOURAGING INCREASED CLIMATE ACTION BY NON-
PARTY STAKEHOLDERS 19 (2015), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/paper/5jm56w74s5wg-en (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2019). 
124  Michael Grubb, Full Legal Compliance with the Kyoto Protocol’s First Commitment Period: Some Lessons, 16 
CLIMATE POL’Y 673 (2016). 
125  Howard, supra note 12, at 179; ANDREAS TUERK ET AL., GREEN INVESTMENT SCHEMES: THE AAU MARKET 
BETWEEN 2008 AND 2012 (2013), https://climatestrategies.org/publication/green-investment-schemes-the-aau-
market-between-2008-2012/. 
126  Shishlov, Morel, & Bellassen, supra note 89, at 777. 
127  Frank Wolke, A Balanced Transition: The Future of the CDM in Light of the Paris Agreement, 6 CARBON 
MECHANISMS REV. 10 (2018). 
 19 
Operational since 2005, the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) remains the 
largest carbon market currently in operation. It presently operates in 31 countries – all 28 EU 
Member States as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway – and covers around 12,000 emitters 
that account for roughly 2 billion metric tons of GHGs or 45% of EU emissions. This makes the 
EU ETS – itself the outcome of a policy turn after initial European resistance against carbon 
markets128  – a centerpiece of EU climate policy.129 Over a dozen directives, regulations and 
decisions set out the legal framework of the EU ETS, linking it to international offsets, extending 
the market to new sectors and gases, establishing a common registry, and providing technical 
guidance and procedural details on design features such as auctioning and MRV.130 
Governance of the EU ETS has evolved significantly since its inception, with competences 
in a number of areas – such as allocation of units and registry operation – becoming successively 
more centralized as implementation at Member State level proved inadequate. Features not yet 
envisioned in the original directive were added over time in response to observed regulatory gaps 
and design shortcomings. Two challenges have attracted particular criticism in the practical 
operation of the EU ETS: a prolonged price weakness coupled with high volatility in the European 
carbon market, as well as a series of criminal activities involving tax fraud, phishing, and outright 
theft. Both are discussed at greater length below. 
During its first trading period from 2005 to 2007, the EU ETS was overshadowed by a 
widely publicized collapse of carbon prices due in large part to insufficient or inaccurate data.131 
European Union Allowances (EUAs) witnessed a price drop from originally more than €32 in the 
spot market in early April 2006 to a figure in the single digits only weeks later. A first set of 
independently verified emissions reports for the year 2005 had been released earlier that month by 
Member States,132 revealing that aggregate emissions were significantly below the annual average 
allocation of allowances for the first period.133 Capacity constraints and an ambitious timeline 
contributed to this information shortfall, although political incentives for Member States to favor 
their domestic industries in the allocation process also influenced national allocation decisions.134 
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Reports of substantial windfall profits for sectors able to pass through the cost of freely allocated 
EUAs added to the reputational damage for the EU ETS.135 
Carbon prices experienced continued weakness over the following two trading periods due 
to an economic slowdown across Europe, greater than expected abatement under complementary 
policies, and extensive use of offset credits from CDM and JI projects.136 When the value of EUAs 
fell to new lows early in the third trading period (2013 to 2020), what had been a simmering crisis 
of confidence erupted in calls for fundamental changes to the European carbon market.137 After 
years of resisting calls for intervention in the carbon market, the European Commission responded 
by initiating a discussion on structural reform options.138 Following initial setbacks, the European 
Council and Parliament eventually approved a delay in the scheduled auction of allowances 
(“backloading”)139  as well as a dynamic supply adjustment mechanism, the Market Stability 
Reserve (MSR).140 Carbon prices have since experienced a gradual recovery, strengthened by 
recent legislative changes for the fourth trading period (2021 to 2030) that introduced a steeper 
emission reduction pathway and accelerated the withdrawal of surplus allowances into the MSR. 
Recent years have also seen a number of criminal activities and efforts to exploit regulatory 
loopholes in the EU ETS, highlighting a need for greater market oversight and governance. 
Individual market participants and speculators have been periodically reported to influence the 
price of EUAs and exaggerate price moves, with evidence that individual traders are seeking to 
move price. Between 2009 and 2010, value-added tax (VAT) fraud – also known as carousel fraud 
– in the course of EUA transactions deprived Member States of more than €5 billion in tax 
revenue.141  2010 and 2011 also saw scandals involving the sale of recycled CERs, phishing 
attempts on the German national registry, and a series of subsequent cyber-thefts affecting several 
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million EUAs.142 Such events eroded confidence in the functioning of the market and prompted 
the European Commission to propose further regulatory reforms.143  
Aside from a directive extending application of the VAT reverse charge mechanism to 
emissions trading, the European Union also strengthened oversight of carbon market transactions 
by closing a substantial gap in the existing regulatory framework. Both primary and a majority of 
secondary market transactions had already been subject to regulatory oversight, but spot market 
transactions were still largely exempted. From the beginning of 2018, a change to the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) mandates trading of derivatives on regulated venues, 
introduces position limits and reporting requirements for derivatives, and – most importantly – 
classifies allowances as financial instruments under MiFID, triggering registration and licensing 
duties, disclosure and reporting requirements, and additional disciplines for the previously 
unregulated spot market.144 Additionally, from 2012 onwards, the European Union has operated a 
single European registry for EUAs and other units, the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL), 
enabling centralized oversight of all transactions. 
What the track record of the EU ETS highlights is, once again, the critical role of 
information. Regulatory decisions on the overall amount of allowances and their allocation have 
suffered from information asymmetries, a lack of accurate data, and uncertainty about fundamental 
trends, severely undermining the functioning of the European carbon market during its first trading 
periods. Implementing a policy solution for the supply and demand imbalance in the carbon market 
has taken over a decade, in part due to rent seeking behavior of affected sectors and Member States. 
Likewise, incidents of market power and abuse have required a regulatory response, although the 
additional restrictions – while justified to secure market integrity and restore confidence among its 
participants – may also impact market liquidity. As an intervention to correct the market failure of 
unpriced externalities, the EU ETS has, in other words, evidenced various forms of government 
failure and undergone a difficult process to address design flaws and identify the appropriate level 
of regulation.  
Yet it also has demonstrated how continuous improvement helped ensure its durability as a 
climate policy, and while it is still early to assess the lasting impact of the latest reforms, a recent 
substantial increase in EUA prices145 suggests that they are showing the desired effect. What is 
more, the EU ETS saw a liquid market for allowances emerge in the first years of trading, measured 
in terms of the frequency and size of transactions, the number and type of market participants, and 
the average size of spreads.146 Since then, the EU ETS has reached maturity, with a number of 
competing trading platforms – including the European Energy Exchange (EEX), the 
Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), and the European Climate Exchange (ECX) – as well as high 
trading volumes both through exchanges and over-the-counter (OTC) transactions, a wide range 
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of traded products in the spot and derivative markets, and a diverse set of market participants, 
including compliance entities and various financial service providers and other intermediaries. As 
a result, price discovery has been efficient and transparent, highlighting the role of broad market 
participation – with implications for the debate about eligibility restrictions and a potential role of 
the private sector in cooperative approaches under Article 6. 
C. Interim Conclusions 
Striking the right balance between regulation and flexibility has posed a perennial challenge to 
policy makers looking to implement functioning markets. As shown in the previous sections, the 
theoretical literature supports regulatory intervention where it is necessary to correct market 
failures, which not only include the environmental externality of GHG emissions, but also 
information asymmetries and issues of market power. Aside from the political decision to 
introduce a carbon market with an appropriately ambitious target to begin with, this argues for a 
role of government in creating a governance framework that guarantees rights and enforces 
obligations (with tangible penalties, if necessary), ensures transparency of emissions and of market 
transactions, facilitates efficient price discovery, and secures the integrity of the market against 
market power and collusion.  
Importantly, both theory and experience affirm the importance of stringent environmental 
objectives for robust market participation, scarcity in the market and price discovery.147 As the 
case studies document, regulatory loopholes and integrity flaws undermine the confidence of 
market participants and create pressure for reform. Sometimes, as in the case of unilateral 
restrictions on the acceptance of CERs, such reforms can be abrupt and have unintended 
consequences. More often, however, reforms progress slowly, weakening public acceptance of the 
carbon market, and compromising its perceived legitimacy as a policy instrument. 
To be a credible tool for climate change mitigation, in other words, carbon markets require 
a sound regulatory framework; ignoring that imperative in the interest of expedience or under 
pressure from interested stakeholders will ultimately backfire. That said, simplicity and 
transparency in applicable rules as well as streamlined procedures should be sought whenever 
possible. Transaction costs and capacity constraints have had a documented effect on the operation 
of existing carbon markets. Individual approval of transactions, in particular, tends to increase 
transaction cost and give rise to uncertainty,148 advocating for standardization to reduce layers of 
bureaucracy. Meanwhile, restrictions on participation – notably the exclusion of private sector 
participants from international emissions trading – have been shown to impact market liquidity, 
whereas greater market access in the EU ETS has contributed to the emergence of a liquid and 
mature market with greater resilience against market power as well as efficient price discovery. 
Beyond the essential governance requirements outlined above, therefore, the invariable 
tradeoffs caused by government failure suggest a higher burden of justification for regulatory 
intervention. Assumptions of the impartiality or rationality of government actors may be as 
misplaced as assumptions of always rational and profit-maximizing market participants. Not all 
risks that flow from the use of carbon markets can be averted through regulation, bar shutting down 
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market activity altogether. Even after several reforms, for instance, the sophisticated rules designed 
to ensure the environmental integrity of CDM projects have proven incapable of preventing a 
considerable share of projects with little or no additionality.149 Yet at the same time, there is an 
appreciable risk that pursuit of indefectible governance frameworks – however well-intended – 
will end up deterring uptake of market approaches,150 along with the cost savings these offer. 
In short, the lessons from theory and experience cannot do away entirely with the need for 
balancing contending preferences. Perceptions of the relative importance of different objectives 
vary too much for that, as do interpretations of normative terms such as ambition and integrity. 
What may appear excessively burdensome governance to some may appear barely adequate to 
others. 151  Where technically complex and normatively contested viewpoints are difficult to 
reconcile, and their proponents can draw on reasonable arguments and legitimate concerns, the 
required balancing act calls for a process that aggregates preferences to reach a mutually acceptable 
outcome.  
Because it is geared towards a policy decision, the aggregating mechanism in this case is 
not a market, but the political process. As ideally conceived, it will afford equality of access to all 
affected stakeholders, and base formal decisions on informed deliberation and public reasoning.152 
Such an ideal process can only be aspired to – and is certainly not realized – by the tenuous and 
often intransparent practices of international diplomacy.153 Nonetheless, an argument can be made 
for requiring that substantive choices, and especially those on contested and consequential matters, 
be made at the highest political level afforded in the international regime. 
In practice, that means reserving the most eminent political questions for deliberation and 
decision making by the Parties, with the outcome reflected in a formal treaty and subsequently 
legitimized through national procedures in every acceding jurisdiction. 154  Decisions by 
Conferences or Meetings of the Parties can still claim a degree of procedural legitimacy, but their 
normative character is already diminished, and, in fact, debated relative to that of the actual 
treaty.155 This applies even more to the outcomes of negotiations from subsidiary entities with 
limited participation and less transparent processes, which should therefore focus on technical 
matters, but not seek to reverse or reinterpret the consensus expressed in the actual treaty. 
Applied to Article 6(2), this calls for identification of the mandate for operational guidance 
in the Paris Agreement itself, and ascertaining the extent to which Parties intended such guidance 
to apply to merely technical or also political questions about the appropriate balance of 
international oversight and national sovereignty. Likewise, the choices underlying ambition and 
environmental integrity have to be dissected to determine whether their center of gravity falls more 
on the political or technical side. Critically, this also means that questions which are clearly 
political in character – such as the ambition of domestic mitigation efforts, something the Paris 
Agreement fundamentally leaves to determination by the Parties – should not be reopened by way 
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of technical deliberations on market design, where the negotiating dynamic and process will 
fundamentally differ from that of the negotiations preceding the Paris Agreement itself. 
This is the analytical framework, based on insights from the theory and practice of carbon 
markets, that will be applied to the context of Article 6 negotiations in the following section. It 
identifies critical issues for governance, but also acknowledges the potential drawbacks of 
excessive regulation. It also proposes a distinction between technical and political questions, with 
implications for the appropriate venue and format of decision making. Applying this framework 
first necessitates an assessment of the negotiating mandate under Article 6(2) and subsequent 
decisions as it relates to the question of ambition, followed by a survey of Party positions and their 
reflection in the evolving negotiations, including the latest textual proposal. Concluding this 
assessment is an attempt to formulate principles for Article 6(2) guidance that reflect the analytical 
framework and fall within the identified political and legal opportunity space. 
III. OPERATIONALIZING ARTICLE 6(2): THE PARIS RULEBOOK 
A. Role and Status of the Paris Rulebook 
With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, its 195 signatories committed to a collective “paradigm 
that, over time, catalyzes ever stronger global action to combat climate change”. 156  With its 
decentralized architecture built on nationally determined mitigation pledges, it departs markedly 
from its predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol. Many of its provisions – including Article 6(2) – are 
sparsely worded and replete with undefined or vague concepts, reflecting a lack of consensus on 
more detailed language at the time of adoption. When it comes to operationalization, however, 
such “constructive ambiguity” – often a deliberate inclusion in negotiated outcomes to 
accommodate conflicting viewpoints – is not helpful.157 Not only does it contribute to uncertainty 
about various elements of the Paris Agreement, it also threatens to compromise effective 
implementation of key rights and obligations due to divergent interpretations.158 
In the decision formally adopting the Paris Agreement and several provisions of the treaty 
itself, Parties have therefore set out mandates to elaborate more detailed operational rules, 
modalities, procedures, and guidelines on a broad set of issues ranging from mitigation and 
adaptation to transparency, accounting, compliance, and assessment of progress.159 Collectively, 
these operational details are being elaborated as part of the “Work Program under the Paris 
Agreement” (PAWP),160 which is colloquially referred to as the “Paris Rulebook.” Following an 
ambitious timeline agreed in Marrakesh during COP23, this Work Program was scheduled for 
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adoption by the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) in December 2018 at 
Katowice, Poland.161  
Working through three bodies of the UNFCCC, namely the Ad Hoc Working Group on the 
Paris Agreement (APA), the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA), and 
the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), Parties elaborated draft negotiating texts for the 
various agenda items. After the latest round of discussions, held from 4 to 9 September 2018 in 
Bangkok, Thailand, progress made across all three bodies was compiled into a single 307-page 
document that provided a basis for the negotiations in Katowice.162 Across all agenda items, views 
on the structure and content of implementation guidance remained widely heterogeneous, 
prompting observers to characterize the outcome as “uneven” and explain the slow pace of 
negotiations with principled disagreement on several key issues, such as differentiation between 
developed and developing countries.163  
Regarding Article 6(2), this compilation contained a 31-page section elaborated by SBSTA 
with draft elements of guidance on matters such as general principles; scope, and whether the 
guidance also applies to mitigation activities under Article 6(4); the characteristics of an ITMO, 
and whether units generated under other mechanisms – such as Article 6(4) and the CDM – as well 
as mitigation outcomes other than emission reductions can qualify as ITMOs; alternative forms of 
oversight and institutional governance; participation requirements and responsibilities, including 
institutional structures and types of NDCs a Party needs to have in place to engage in cooperative 
approaches; how and when Parties should make corresponding adjustments for emissions covered 
by their NDC; and the modalities for the share of proceeds for adaptation.164  
On 15 October 2018, the presiding officers of APA, SBI and SBSTA issued a “Joint 
Reflections Note” addressing progress made to date under all elements of the work program, with 
annexes containing new textual proposals meant to “facilitate completion of the PAWP at COP 
24.”165 Among these was a new textual proposal for guidance on Article 6(2), which – while not 
superseding the outcome of the Bangkok meeting – tried “to advance the thinking of Parties by 
removing remaining duplication; streamlining where there are multiple options, including 
grouping options into suboptions where appropriate, and moving detail to the workplan where this 
may assist readability of the options; lightly editing the text; improving consistency of wording; 
and simplifying language where possible.”166 Already shorter at 24 pages, with an Annex listing 
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follow-up work to be carried out in 2019, this document retained the options contained in the draft 
outcome of the prior Bangkok negotiations, but organized them more efficiently. A table outlining 
the options and suboptions relevant to matters of governance, ambition, and environmental 
integrity is included below.167 As the number of options that still remained on the table – even on 
the least contested matters under negotiation – underscored, however, the final form and content 
of guidance on Article 6(2) was far from settled.  
Given the status of the textual proposal, it was already becoming clear before Katowice 
that none of the extant proposals had successfully captured all major viewpoints. Accordingly, 
going into the Katowice negotiations, Parties already acknowledged that they would have to 
prioritize their efforts and concentrate on those matters that already enjoyed a measure of support, 
while leaving contested issues and purely technical details for continued negotiation in the years 
to come.168 As one participant in the negotiations commented, COP24 was expected to result in “a 
very general decision, a one-pager with two annexes”, where the first annex would contain basic 
decisions reached at COP24, and the second outline “a work plan for 2019 covering all remaining 
technical deliverables”.169 Even that, however, proved too optimistic. 
Despite a promising start, with an influential group of countries submitting a joint proposal 
on contested accounting issues,170 the latest negotiating text remained encumbered by competing 
options and bracketed text.171 Parties were unable to agree on the required level of uniformity and 
prescriptiveness  regarding corresponding adjustments and conversion of metrics.172 Other items 
that eluded consensus were mandatory deduction of a share of proceeds for adaptation, and the 
role of land use and forestry activities under cooperative approaches. 173  Negotiations nearly 
derailed when a small subset of Parties – notably Brazil and the Arab Group – opposed inclusion 
of language on corresponding adjustments in the operational details for Article 6(4) that was seen 
to be essential by other parties to prevent double counting of emission reductions.174  
                                                 
and Paragraphs 36–40 of Decision 1/CP.21, U.N. Doc. APA-SBSTA-SBI.2018.Informal.2.Add.2, para. 5 (Oct. 
15, 2018), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/APA_SBSTA_SBI.2018.Informal.2.Add_.2.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2019). 
167  See Table 1, infra, Section III.C.1. 
168  UNFCCC, Joint Reflections Note Addendum 2, supra, note 165, at para. 4. 
169  Forth, supra note 34, at 4. 
170  Submitted by the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), Australia, Canada, the 
European Union, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and Switzerland, this proposal underscored the need for 
corresponding adjustments when transferring mitigation outcomes under Article 6, see WOLFGANG OBERGASSEL 
ET AL., PARIS AGREEMENT: SHIP MOVES OUT OF THE DRYDOCK. AN ASSESSMENT OF COP24 IN KATOWICE 14 
(2019), https://wupperinst.org/fa/redaktion/downloads/publications/COP24-Report.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 
2019). 
171  At one point counting nearly 30 pages in length, the latest draft text on guidance for Article 6(2) was eventually 
narrowed down to a mere eight pages in Katowice, yet important matters still remained bracketed, see U.N. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Guidance on Cooperative Approaches Referred to in Article 6, 
Paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, in The Katowice Texts: Proposal by the President (Dec. 14, 2018), 32-38, 
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Katowice%20text%2C%2014%20Dec2018_1015AM.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
172  IISD Reporting Services, Summary of the Bangkok Climate Change Conference: 4-9 September 2018, 12 EARTH 
NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN 18 (Dec. 18, 2018), http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12733e.pdf (last visited Mar. 
10, 2019). 
173  CHARLOTTE STRECK ET AL., COP24 KATOWICE: SETTING THE PARIS AGREEMENT IN MOTION 4 (2019), 
https://climatefocus.com/publications/cop24-katowice-setting-paris-agreement-motion (last visited Mar. 14, 
2019). 
174  OBERGASSEL ET AL., supra note 171, at 14. 
 27 
In the end, the Katowice climate summit went into overtime as negotiators sought to break 
the impasse over Article 6, yet various attempts to secure a consensus through compromise 
proposals failed.175 To allow adoption of the remaining elements of the “Paris Rulebook”, the 
Presidency decided to postpone negotiations on Article 6 to future sessions. In its final decision, 
the CMA noted that no consensus could be reached on the final negotiating text, and called upon 
the SBSTA to build on existing progress and elaborate a new proposal for adoption at its second 
session.176 Importantly, different negotiating texts remain on the table following the Katowice 
climate summit,177 meaning that no single proposal is fully representative of the current views of 
all Parties.  
Overall, thus, Parties still face a large number of choices following the Katowice summit, 
and retain considerable latitude in how they address matters that are relevant to ensuring ambition 
in the guidance on Article 6(2). To better understand the parameters within which they will 
exercise this latitude, it is necessary to dissect the legal mandate governing the negotiations, as 
well as its relationship to other elements of the Paris Agreement and the work program. From 
there, the analysis can proceed to map the substantive options contained in the most recent textual 
proposal, and survey Party views as reflected in statements and submissions. 
B. Legal Analysis: Mapping the Mandate of Article 6(2) 
1. Textual Analysis of Article 6(2) 
A literal reading of Article 6(2) of the Paris Agreement provides the first and most authoritative 
indication of the scope and limitations of the mandate to elaborate operational guidance. Because 
the provision forms part of an international treaty that has been ratified, accepted, approved or 
otherwise acceded to178 in conformity with the domestic procedures of its Parties, the language in 
Article 6(2) is the most immediate manifestation of state consent that underlies the normative 
validity of the Paris Agreement. That said, the wording of Article 6(2) is sparse as far as the content 
and purpose of guidance is concerned. It states that: 
Parties shall, where engaging on a voluntary basis in cooperative approaches 
that involve the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards 
nationally determined contributions, promote sustainable development and 
ensure environmental integrity and transparency, including in governance, and 
shall apply robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of double 
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counting, consistent with guidance adopted by the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.179 
What can be clearly inferred from the provision is a mandate for the CMA to adopt guidance. Less 
clear, however, is whether the mandate merely relates to the “robust accounting to ensure, inter 
alia, the avoidance of double counting” directly preceding its mention in Article 6(2), or whether 
it also extends to the other conditions spelled out therein for voluntary use of cooperative 
approaches involving the use of ITMOs towards NDCs, namely to “promote sustainable 
development and ensure environmental integrity and transparency, including in governance.” 
Müller draws attention to the conscious use of “inter alia” as a reflection of concerns among some 
Parties that avoidance of double counting is insufficient to ensure “robust accounting”, although 
that still does not clarify whether guidance should go beyond accounting.180 Commentators have 
also drawn on the wording “consistent with guidance” to argue that such guidance is not meant to 
impose constraints on Parties using ITMOs, as they would have then opted for different language, 
such as “subject to guidance” or “subject to rules”.181 
While its normative character is significantly weaker relative to a treaty provision such as 
Article 6(2), the decision accompanying the Paris Agreement sets out additional detail on the 
mandate by requesting SBSTA to  
… develop and recommend the guidance referred to under Article 6, paragraph 
2, of the Agreement for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first 
session, including guidance to ensure that double counting is avoided on the 
basis of a corresponding adjustment by Parties for both anthropogenic emissions 
by sources and removals by sinks covered by their nationally determined 
contributions under the Agreement.182 
Again, the wording of this decision fails to specify the precise scope of the guidance. By expressly 
referring to the avoidance of double counting “on the basis of a corresponding adjustment”, this 
passage seems to imply that guidance only should cover accounting issues, and not the other 
substantive conditions mentioned in Article 6(2). Its mention of “including”, however, could be 
interpreted to mean that avoidance of double counting is only one of several possible elements that 
might be included in operational guidance. While this provides an opening for arguments that 
Article 6(2) guidance should extend to considerations other than accounting, it is important to 
remember that its status as a COP decision is subservient to the actual treaty, the Paris 
Agreement.183  
Guiding principles for the interpretation of ambiguous treaty provisions are set out in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),184 which is reflective of international custom, 
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.185  According to its general rule of treaty 
interpretation set out in Article 31(1), a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
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with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose.” Relevant context can include “[a]ny instrument which was made by one 
or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as 
an instrument related to the treaty”186 and “[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”187 Article 32 proceeds 
to list supplementary means of interpretation, stating that: 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order 
to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to 
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31 … leaves 
the meaning ambiguous or obscure.188 
Together, these rules of interpretation affirm the relevance of other provisions in the Paris 
Agreement, including the remaining paragraphs of Article 6. They also clarify that other 
instruments and subsequent state practice can offer guidance when interpreting ambiguous treaty 
provisions, which, applied to Article 6(2), includes the decision accompanying the Paris 
Agreement. And finally, the interpretation rules highlight the importance of preparatory work and 
other evidence of the circumstances at the time the treaty was adopted, commonly referred to as 
the travaux préparatoires. All these sources of interpretive guidance will be drawn on next to 
further complement the textual interpretation of Article 6(2) and the mandate it contains. 
2. Narrow Context: Elements of Article 6 
When looking at other elements of Article 6, it is useful to begin with the first paragraph, which 
has been labelled a chapeau, or general introduction, to the use of cooperative approaches.189 
Article 6(1) of the Paris Agreement introduces the general notion that Parties may choose, on a 
voluntary basis, to cooperate in the implementation of their NDCs. Its wording includes express 
reference to ambition and environmental integrity when it states that Parties choose to pursue such 
cooperation “to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions and to promote 
sustainable development and environmental integrity.”190 Despite the fact that this language does 
not literally state an increase in ambition as a mandatory outcome of voluntary cooperation, that 
very effect has been described as “the requirement in the Paris Agreement to legitimize the 
existence of the option for renewed carbon market mechanisms”.191 Use of “their” in Article 6(1) 
has, moreover, been interpreted as meaning that Article 6 should contribute to higher ambition in 
the mitigation targets and actions of both the originating or transferring countries as well as the 
acquiring or using countries.192 
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Although variously mentioned throughout the Paris Agreement and in relevant 
decisions,193 ambition remains an elusive term, suggesting that Parties intentionally opted for 
“constructive ambiguity”194 in order to facilitate consensus. Attempts at a more tangible definition 
of the concept can be found in the literature. In the broadest sense, ambition has been said to reflect 
the global aggregate of mitigation action; 195  it would thus extend beyond the concept of 
environmental integrity, which can already be satisfied where emission reductions in one 
jurisdiction are accompanied by a commensurate increase in emissions elsewhere, without a 
decline in overall emissions.196 Ambition is also distinct from the notion of “overall mitigation” 
mentioned in Article 6(4) of the Paris Agreement,197 which is not linked to the actions of any one 
Party, but rather to the overall effect of the mechanism created by that provision.198 
Aside from such initial boundaries, ambition remains “complex and difficult to 
determine”, 199  prompting commentators to propose elements or criteria to better identify the 
presence of ambition. Howard suggests the following six conditions that market policies should 
meet to embody high ambition and promote rising ambition over time: 1) NDC targets are set 
below expected emissions under a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario; 2) new demand for emission 
reductions is created; 3) mitigation action is broadened; 4) environmental quality is ensured; 5) 
coverage of emission inventories is expanded; and 6) communication of mitigation goals and 
policies is clear.200  
Of these, the first may be the most critical, as it relates to the potential transfer of ITMOs 
which do not reflect any underlying mitigation efforts. A recent survey comparing NDCs and BAU 
emission projections has underscored this risk by revealing that such “hot air” – where NDC targets 
are likely to be achieved or overachieved without further climate action – could eclipse expected 
emission reductions from countries whose NDCs require actual abatement. 201  Importantly, 
however, these understandings of ambition are not necessarily reflective of how Parties interpret 
the underlying concepts. It is also not clear from the wording of Article 6(1) that ambition is a 
mandatory condition for the use of cooperative approaches, nor that operational guidance on 
Article 6(2) has to necessarily incorporate ambition. 
In effect, ambition does not even feature in the wording of Article 6(2). What Article 6(2) 
does, however, specify are conditions for use of cooperative approaches “that involve the use of 
internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards nationally determined contributions”, 
making their observance mandatory by using the legally relevant term “shall”. 202  Of these 
conditions, the second refers to environmental integrity, for which there again is no generally 
accepted interpretation.203 In the literature, definitions tend to relate environmental integrity to the 
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ITMOs themselves, seeing it compromised if a transfer of ITMOs leads to global emission levels 
that are higher than they would be otherwise.204  
At a minimum, that understanding of environmental integrity requires that reductions really 
occur as stated and have lasting mitigation effect,205 and that they are accurately tracked and 
accounted for to avoid double counting.206 Some authors further list additionality,207 quality of 
units, ambition of the NDC targets of the transferring country, and presence of incentives and 
disincentives for further mitigation action208 as conditions of environmental integrity, although the 
relevance of such criteria for Article 6(2) is debated.209 
Given the diversity of NDC pledges and limited role of international oversight under the 
Paris Agreement, ensuring environmental integrity has been described as a challenge for 
implementation of Article 6.210 Still, barring complex questions of additionality, it seems that 
integrity can be ensured through proper technical design and process.211 That would predestine 
issues of integrity for inclusion in operational guidance on the implementation of Article 6(2).212 
It bears noting, however, that there is still considerable ambiguity concerning how environmental 
integrity is to be operationalized under Article 6.1, and there has been no explicit work program 
associated with it in the decision accompanying the Paris Agreement.213  
Accordingly, some commentators have taken a more cautious and literal approach to the 
interpretation of Article 6, recalling the decentralized, Party-driven nature of the Paris 
Agreement.214 As they argue, Article 6 is meant to cover all existing cases of cooperation; they 
highlight that “cooperation is noted, acknowledged, and recognized, rather than approved” under 
the Paris Agreement, reinforcing the “decentralized and bottom-up nature and ethos” of 
governance thereunder.215 On this point, Howard notes that Article 6 is “careful not to suggest that 
the Paris Agreement gives countries permission to cooperate, as many countries consider they do 
not need such permission.”216 To support the view that Article 6(2) needs to be interpreted favoring 
flexibility over prescriptiveness, commentators also cite the wording of Article 6(4), which clearly 
states that the its mechanism is “under the authority and guidance” of the CMA, whereas Articles 
6(2) and 6(3) make no such provision and instead refer to the respective role of Parties.217  
What remains is an overall impression of conceptual ambiguity. In view of the foregoing 
rules of treaty interpretation, and the primacy of a literal interpretation based on the ordinary 
meaning of relevant terms, it is clear that notions of ambition and environmental integrity cannot 
be conclusively defined based on the language of Article 6 alone. Viewpoints and proposals found 
in the literature cannot supplant or supersede the literal interpretation of relevant treaty text, 
                                                 
204  HOWARD, supra note 3, at 12; KREIBICH, supra note 12, at 4; OBERGASSEL & ASCHE, supra note 100, at 1; 
Schneider & La Hoz Theuer, supra note 26, at 387. 
205  HOWARD, supra note 3, at 12. 
206  Ahlberg, supra note 24, at 24. 
207  HOWARD, supra note 3, at 12; see however Howard, supra note 12, at 193. 
208  Wolke, supra note 128, at 12. 
209  ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB), supra note 182, at 20. 
210  Schneider & La Hoz Theuer, supra note 26, at 387. 
211  Howard, supra note 12, at 193; OBERGASSEL & ASCHE, supra note 100, at 19. 
212  For further discussion, see infra, Section III.C.2.b. 
213  ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB), supra note 182, at 8. 
214  See, e.g., ANDREI MARCU, WHAT IS STANDING IN THE WAY OF A HAPPY ENDING: REFLECTIONS ON ART. 6 BEFORE 
SBSTA 48 1 (2018), https://ercst.org/publication-happy-ending-before-sb44 (last visited Mar. 13, 2019).. 
215  ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB), supra note 182, at 3. 
216  Howard, supra note 12, at 184. 
217  MARCU, supra note 215, at 5. 
 32 
especially when the literature is still narrowly dominated by authors from a small subset of affected 
Parties,218 and is thus not reflective of the full diversity of views across negotiating groups and 
geographical regions. What can be affirmed with confidence, however, is that ambition and 
environmental integrity form part of the broader Paris Agreement, and hence can play a role when 
exercising the mandate to adopt guidance on Article 6(2) – although, again, this does not 
predetermine a specific outcome or interpretation. An assessment of the broader context of Article 
6 – notably the remaining provisions of the Paris Agreement – does not change this assessment, 
but it offers additional interpretive guidance. 
3. Broader Context: The Paris Agreement 
As mentioned earlier, the VCLT requires that an international treaty be interpreted “in the light of 
its object and purpose.” This expands the range of relevant interpretive guidance on Article 6(2) 
and the mandate it contains to the entirety of the Paris Agreement, including its overarching 
objectives of “strengthen[ing] the global response to the threat of climate change” and “[h]olding 
the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and 
pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels” (Article 
2(1)). It also allows for consideration of other provisions with a bearing on Article 6(2), such as 
Article 4 on the NDC cycle, Article 13 on the enhanced transparency framework, and Article 15 
on compliance.219  
When it comes to ambition more specifically, the word is referenced in several other 
provisions of the Paris Agreement: Article 3 requires Parties “to undertake and communicate 
ambitious efforts” which “will represent a progression over time”; Article 4(3) requires that NDCs 
represent a “progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution and 
reflect its highest possible ambition”; Article 4(5) states that “enhanced support for developing 
country Parties will allow for higher ambition in their actions”; Article 4(11) allows Parties to 
adjust their NDCs at any time “with a view to enhancing its level of ambition”; and Article 6(8) – 
which relates to non-market approaches – mentions the general aim of such approaches “to 
promote mitigation and adaptation ambition.”  
Kreibich draws on these references to conclude that ambition relates to both targets and 
actions, which can thus express high or low ambition.220  He concedes that the discussion of 
ambition in the negotiations has largely focused on NDCs and the mitigation pledges contained 
therein, but points to the voluntary nature of NDCs as an argument for extending the relevance of 
ambition to actions alongside targets. His exegetic application also infers that use of the word 
“higher” in Article 4(5) means ambition levels can be compared, although the provision does not 
indicate how such a comparison might occur, nor how ambition can be increased. This, again, 
underscores that ambition may form an intrinsic element of the Paris Agreement and is, as such, a 
valid consideration in the interpretation of Article 6(2), but that it simultaneously does not dictate 
a specific material outcome. 
                                                 
218  It is also worth noting that a vast majority of the existing literature on the concepts has been commissioned by a 
limited number of governments, see supra, note 27; while this need not influence the research process and results, 
it does raise questions about the politics of research, and how a subset of stakeholders can influence a political 
discussion with resources potentially unavailable to other stakeholders. 
219  ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB), supra note 182, at 5. 
220  KREIBICH, supra note 12. 
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4. Travaux Préparatoires 
In his detailed account of the negotiating history of Article 6, Müller documents deeply held 
differences between country positions in the negotiations preceding adoption of the Paris 
Agreement.221 Among the tensions evident during the negotiations was a bifurcation between the 
view held mostly by a group of developed countries with market mechanisms in place that these 
could be more efficiently regulated domestically rather than under the UNFCCC, and a view that 
was more prevalent in the developing world – notably in Brazil and several countries from the G77 
& China negotiating group – arguing that accounting and environmental integrity concerns called 
for rigorous standards and multilateral oversight.222 Some Parties were altogether opposed to 
market-based approaches for climate change mitigation, leading to an ideological divide between 
proponents and opponents of market mechanisms. 
With regards to governance, several countries favored a top-down rules-based system such 
as that introduced with the Kyoto Protocol, whereas others supported non-prescriptive guidance 
without obligatory rules, instead suggesting that reliance on the general transparency framework 
being elaborated under the Paris Agreement would suffice. For some countries, notably the United 
States and Canada, prescriptive accounting rules raised fundamental sovereignty concerns because 
of subnational cross-border carbon market cooperation, for which they had little oversight. 
Growing heterogeneity of climate actions, including market approaches, further complicated the 
negotiations.223 Given the array of seemingly irreconcilable positions, few observers expected a 
consensus to emerge during COP21 in Paris, and it was only a concerted effort by a small group 
of Parties – led by Brazil and the European Union – that allowed the divisions to be overcome in 
the final days of the negotiations. 
While Article 6(2), for instance, makes reference to “governance” – an element that was 
added to the final text to accommodate concerns of those Parties insisting on stronger multilateral 
oversight 224  – its choice of words carefully avoids specifying what such governance entails, 
allowing for alternative interpretations.225  Similarly, the omission of earlier references to the 
concept of additionality in the final text indicates that Parties were unable to agree on the material 
quality threshold this would have introduced for use of ITMO. 226  Overall, thus, the travaux 
préparatoires can only offer limited guidance for the interpretation of Article 6(2), aside from 
affirming the balancing act between contending Party views that is already apparent from a literal 
rendition of its text. 
5. Interim Conclusions 
Applying the recognized rules of treaty interpretation set out in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT 
offers only limited clarification on the ambiguous concepts of ambition, environmental integrity, 
governance, and the mandate to elaborate guidance set out in Article 6(2). What this exegetic 
process affirms, instead, is a recurring tension between elements that favor greater environmental 
                                                 
221  MÜLLER, supra note 10, at 8. 
222  Howard, supra note 12, at 182; MÜLLER, supra note 10, at 8. 
223  MÜLLER, supra note 10. 
224  Id., at 8. 
225  Given the sequence of words, “Parties shall … promote sustainable development and ensure environmental 
integrity and transparency, including in governance”, it could be argued that Parties either have an obligation to 
a) ensure transparency in governance, or b) ensure environmental integrity and transparency in governance, or c) 
promote sustainable development and ensure environmental integrity and transparency in governance. 
226  ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB), supra note 182, at 21. 
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stringency and multilateral oversight, and elements that reflect the decentralized and Party-driven 
dynamic that has found its embodiment in the Paris Agreement. As shown in the brief discussion 
of the travaux préparatoires, this paradigmatic tension can be traced back to the substantial 
differences between major groups of Parties in the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the 
Paris Agreement.  
Both a literal interpretation of Article 6(2) as well as its context and negotiating history 
clearly indicate that ambition and environmental concerns are relevant considerations in the 
implementation of this provision; yet they also unmistakably attest to the unease some Parties felt 
at including prescriptive statements on oversight and spelling out substantive criteria for 
environmental integrity or ambition. Neither the general rule of treaty interpretation nor the 
supplementary means of interpretation can, moreover, conclusively answer whether the mandate 
to adopt guidance is limited to accounting, or extends to the other two conditions for use of ITMOs 
contained in Article 6(2). 
Uncertainties about the implications of the Article 6(2) mandate do not stop there. As 
Bodansky and Rajamani explain in a recent assessment of the options for implementation of the 
Paris Rulebook, Parties retain considerable latitude when adopting operational rules, including the 
decision on whether to adopt such rules in the first place, and whether to frame such guidance in 
terms of a binding obligation, a recommendation, or merely an expectation of conduct or 
outcome.227 What is more, when Parties decide to adopt operational rules, the Paris Agreement 
affords them broad discretion on how detailed and precise these rules should be.228 In general, the 
two scholars argue, more detailed and precise rules provide greater consistency, predictability, and 
international discipline, and lend themselves to assessments of compliance; but they require greater 
agreement and thus are more difficult to negotiate. By contrast, less detailed rules may be simpler 
to agree and enable the regime to evolve more easily in response to experience and emerging 
science. Importantly, they highlight that an absence of detailed or prescriptive provisions will 
default to national determination by individual Parties229 or, in the case of international processes 
such as expert review, determination by the entities charged with implementing those processes.230  
C. Political Analysis: Negotiating Issues and Party Views on Article 6(2) 
1. A Continuum of Views 
                                                 
227  Parties can calibrate the bindingness through their choice of verb, and a) make a rule legally binding by providing 
that Parties “shall” act in accordance with it; b) recommend that Parties use a rule, by providing that Parties 
“should” follow it; c) identify a rule but make its use optional, by providing that Parties “may” follow it; or d) 
identify a rule and generate an expectation that countries “will” follow it, see Daniel M. Bodansky & Lavanya 
Rajamani, The Issues That Never Die, 12 CARBON & CLIM. L. REV. 184, 186 (2018). 
228  Parties could, in descending order of prescriptiveness, a) adopt detailed, precise guidance; b) identify a number 
of alternative approaches, among which a Party could choose; c) prescribe minimum requirements, and allow 
Parties to nationally determine any additional rules; d) prescribe general standards that national rules must satisfy, 
but allow Parties to develop their own rules; e) allow Parties to develop their own rules, and simply require them 
to report on their rules; or f) not adopt any additional guidance at all, see Id., at 187. 
229  This is consistent with the permissive nature of international law more generally, which holds that States retain 
sovereignty over their actions except where they have expressly consented to limit their sovereignty, be it through 
a treaty or through customary practice recognized as law, see Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fra. v. Tur.), Judgment, 
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 45–47 (Sept. 7). 
230  Bodansky & Rajamani, supra note 228, at 185–188. 
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As the previous Section established, a textual analysis of Article 6(2) including consideration of 
its context and negotiating history affirms considerable discretion for Parties as they exercise the 
mandate to adopt guidance on the use of ITMOs. Understanding the relevant views of Parties as 
expressed in statements and submissions is therefore useful to garner a better sense of how the 
numerous options still on the table in the latest textual proposal will be decided. Over the course 
of the negotiations on Article 6(2) guidance, Parties have voiced widely divergent preferences 
about issues of ambition, environmental integrity, and governance.231  
Specific positions will be broken down by relevant negotiating issues in the next section, 
but overall, Party statements and submissions reveal a distribution of views along a continuum 
between strong and weak prescriptiveness, oversight at the multilateral level and flexible self-
determination at the level of Parties, and a greater or lesser degree of centrally defined criteria 
related to ambition and environmental integrity.232 Accordingly, several Parties – including, in 
particular, the Umbrella Group233 as well as the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)234 – 
have taken the view that guidance should be restricted to accounting issues, such as avoidance of 
double counting,235 while other groups of Parties – such as the African Group of Negotiators 
(AGN),236 Brazil,237 the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG),238 the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs), 239  and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) 240  – have tended to advocate for 
multilateral rules addressing all aspects of environmental integrity, transparency, sustainable 
development, and accounting contained in Article 6(2). Meanwhile, the European Union has 
                                                 
231  GREINER & MICHAELOWA, supra note 28; OBERGASSEL & ASCHE, supra note 100; ANDREI MARCU, ARTICLE 6 
OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT: REFLECTIONS ON PARTY SUBMISSIONS BEFORE MARRAKECH (2017), 
https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/article_6_of_the_paris_agreement_ii_final_0.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2019). 
232  WORLD BANK, ECOFYS & VIVID ECONOMICS, STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2017 39 (2017).   
233  The Umbrella Group is a coalition of Parties consisting of Australia, Belarus, Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States, see UNFCCC, Party 
Groupings, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties/party-groupings (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2019). 
234  The Like-Minded Group of Developing Countries comprises Algeria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, China, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mali, Nicaragua, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela and Vietnam, and thus over 50% of global population. 
235  Australia, Submission on the Content of the Guidance for Article 6.2, including the Structure and Areas, Issues 
and Elements to be Addressed (Oct. 2017), http:// 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/261_344_131535633096840819-
Australia%20Article%206.2%20Submission%20SBSTA%2047.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2019). 
236  Republic of Mali, Submission by the Republic of Mali on behalf of the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) on 
Guidance on Cooperative Approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement (Agenda sub-
item 10(a)) (2017), 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/586_344_131531477338494612-
AGN%20Submission%20on%20SBSTA%2047%20Art.%206.2.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2019). 
237  Brazil, Views of Brazil on the Guidance referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement (2018), 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/73_344_131520605369417046-BRAZIL%20-
%20Article%206.2%20FINAL.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2019). 
238  The Environmental Integrity Group, formed in 2000, comprises Mexico, Liechtenstein, Monaco, the Republic of 
Korea, Switzerland and Georgia, see UNFCCC, Party Groupings, supra, note 233. 
239  The Least Developed Countries group comprises 48 Parties, with group membership based on criteria defined by 
the United Nations, see UNFCCC, Party Groupings, supra, note 233. 
240  This negotiating group is a coalition of some 40 low-lying islands that are particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise, 
see UNFCCC, Party Groupings, supra, note 233. 
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tended to generally support more detailed rules across all elements of the work program.241 Still, 
the dichotomy between Parties advocating more, or less, international oversight is reflected 
throughout the various versions of draft negotiating text, as this question translates into almost 
every aspect of guidance.242  
Commentators have therefore suggested that overall governance of Article 6(2) can follow 
one of four alternative pathways, with additional variations and nuances: a) a strongly 
decentralized governance framework with no multilateral standards or transparency provisions 
related to ambition and environmental integrity; b) a mostly decentralized governance framework 
with minimum standards provided by the CMA in the form of principles or guidelines, but without 
multilateral oversight or transparency provisions on environmental integrity; c) a moderately 
centralized governance framework with mandatory standards and transparency provisions on 
environmental integrity set out by the CMA, possibly subject to review by the technical peer 
review process of the transparency framework under the Paris Agreement, but no centralized 
approval of ITMO use towards NDCs; and d) a strongly centralized governance framework, with 
mandatory standards defined by the CMA, and institutional oversight in the form of an approval 
requirement for ITMOs or their transfer and use exercised by the CMA, the Secretariat, or a 
designated body.243 While the final textual proposal issued by the Presidency of the Katowice 
climate summit in December 2018 does not reflect the latest views of all Parties and will likely see 
significant evolution going forward,244 it envisioned a governance framework that aligns most 
closely to the second pathway – a “mostly decentralized governance framework” – described 
above. 
As it were, these alternative options for guidance on Article 6(2) echo the viewpoints that 
already characterized the negotiations on the provision leading up to the adoption of the Paris 
Agreement. Broken down to individual negotiating issues, the options that call for a decision as 
Parties finalize their discussions on guidance for Article 6(2) with relevance for the balance of 
ambition and flexibility are: institutional governance, various elements of environmental integrity, 
and accounting and transparency. Options related to environmental integrity can be further broken 
down into quality restrictions applicable to ITMOs, quantity restrictions applicable to ITMOs, 
eligibility requirements and responsibilities for cooperating Parties, issues of scope, and 
standardization – or unitization – of ITMOs (see infra, Table 1). Not all relevant options may be 
captured by this attempt at structuring several dozen individual options, and other classifications 
are conceivable; but for the purpose of mapping Party views and priorities on the main issues of 
interest in this article, the proposed categorization should offer an appropriate starting point. 
Table 1: Relevant Negotiating Issues (based on the Presidency Proposal of Dec. 14, 2018)245  
Category Options Location in Textual Proposal 
Institutional 
Governance 
Role of CMA, Secretariat, and 
Technical Expert Review  
Section II, Paras. 2, 4-6  
                                                 
241  European Union, Submission by Estonia and the European Commission on behalf of the European Union and its 
Member States (Oct. 6, 2017), 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/783_317_131345685428746919-MT-03-21-
EU%20SBSTA%2012a%20b%20and%20c%20EU%20Submission%20Article%206.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 
2019). 
242  GREINER & MICHAELOWA, supra note 28, at 9. 
243  ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB), supra note 182, at 12. 
244  MARCU & RAMBHAROS, supra note 178, at 6. 
245  See UNFCCC, The Katowice Texts, supra note 171, at 31-38. 
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Category Options Location in Textual Proposal 
Environmental 
Integrity 
ITMO Metric and Definition Section I. Para. 1 
Participation Responsibilities Section III, Para. 7 
Overall Mitigation in Global 
Emissions 
Section III, Para. 8 
Safeguards and Limits Section XI, Para. 38 
Accounting & 
Transparency 
Tracking Section IV, Para. 9 
Corresponding Adjustment Section V, A-B, Paras. 10-15 
Reporting Section VII, A-B, Paras. 21-27 
Review Section VIII, Paras. 28-30 
ITMO Conversion  Section III, Paras. 10-11 
2. Individual Negotiating Issues 
a. Institutional Governance 
On the question of institutional governance, some Parties have favored a role for the CMA in 
overseeing and reviewing ITMO transfers, or even endorsed the creation of a designated body.246 
Others, by contrast, prefer leaving such governance decisions to the Parties engaged in the transfer, 
with little or no central oversight aside from guidance on “robust accounting.”247 Institutional 
functions fall into several groups. One relates to oversight, which primarily includes the review of 
cooperative approaches and related information for consistency with Article 6(2) guidance, but 
could also extend to additional functions, such as approval or creation of ITMOS, or overseeing a 
third-party review of the environmental integrity of ITMOs at creation. At one point, six options 
for such oversight arrangements were reflected in the negotiating draft: a) establishment of a 
designated body for governance of Article 6(2) specifically; b) establishment of a designated body 
for the governance of Article 6 more generally; c) Article 13 technical expert review; d) Article 6 
technical expert review; e) a combination of the above; or f) no oversight arrangement.248 The 
negotiating text prepared by the Presidency of the Katowice climate summit omitted the option of 
a designated body, and entrusts governance functions to the Secretariat, the CMA, and a technical 
expert review process.249 It bears noting, however, that this textual proposal is not definitive, and 
is likely to evolve further. 
Another institutional function relates to the responsibility for elaborating what constitutes 
an ITMO used towards achievement of an NDC, a responsibility that could rest with the CMA, 
could be assigned to an Article 6 or Article 6(2) body, or be left to Parties participating in the 
                                                 
246  Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Submission of Views on the Content of Article 6(2) Guidance and Article 
6.4 Rules, Modalities and Procedures, presented by the Republic of the Maldives on Behalf of the Alliance of 
Small Island States (Nov. 2017), 4, 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/167_344_131542508049675849-
AOSIS%20Submission%20on%20Art%206.2%20and%20%206.4.Nov.2017.cleandocx.pdf (last visited Mar. 
10, 2019). 
247  Japan, Submission on SBSTA Item 10 (a). Guidance on Cooperative Approaches Referred to in Article 6, 
Paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement (Oct. 2, 2017), 1, 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/579_344_131516859040704385-
Japan_Submission_6.2_20171002.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2019). 
248  See UNFCCC, Joint Reflections Note Addendum 2, supra, note 166, paras. 15-20. 
249  See UNFCCC, The Katowice Texts, supra note 171, at paras. 2, 4-6. 
 38 
cooperative approach.250 The latest negotiating text includes a – still partly bracketed – definition 
of ITMOs, without assigning any institutional roles.251  
A final governance function relates to the role of the UNFCCC Secretariat, which could be 
entrusted with carrying out activities such as reporting on overall mitigation in global emissions, 
or progress made by Parties participating in cooperative approaches in implementing and 
achieving NDCs.252 Again, the latest negotiating text describes only a supporting role of the 
Secretariat, charging it to generally “carry out the activities relating to it set out in this guidance” 
and specifying some tasks, such as the compilation of expert review data and Party reports, the 
maintenance of an Article 6 database, and the establishment of an international registry.253 Some 
oversight functions will already be provided at a domestic or regional level, 254  moreover, 
prompting legitimate questions about the appropriate governance level and a need for further 
elaboration of required governance functions and available governance structures. 
b. Environmental Integrity 
On the broader issue of environmental integrity, a range of competing views and options for their 
operationalization have emerged. ADB groups these in three categories: a) environmental integrity 
only relates to robust accounting of ITMOs, including corresponding adjustments; 255  b) 
environmental integrity relates to both robust accounting and transparency of ITMOs as well as 
their environmental characteristics, which therefore require some form of multilateral governance, 
ranging from broad principles applied by Parties to material quality criteria overseen by the CMA 
or another multilateral institution; and c) environmental integrity relates to both robust accounting 
and transparency of ITMOs and their environmental characteristics, requiring their expression 
through standardized units.256 
Where Parties have advocated for a need to go beyond mere accounting, they have endorsed 
various quantitative and qualitative safeguards to ensure the environmental integrity of cooperative 
approaches. Accordingly, some Parties have suggested including quality or quantity restrictions 
on the transfer or use of ITMOs, such as additionality requirements,257 uniformly defined ITMO 
metrics,258 quantitative limits calculated in percentages of Parties’ mitigation targets, budgets, or 
                                                 
250  See, e.g., UNFCCC, Joint Reflections Note Addendum 2, supra, note 166, para. 7. 
251  See UNFCCC, The Katowice Texts, supra note 171, at para. 1. 
252  Id., paras. 31-32. 
253  See UNFCCC, The Katowice Texts, supra note 171, at paras. 5-6, 31, 33, 36-37. 
254  Bodansky et al., supra note 5, at 963. 
255  ADB lists three sets of arguments advanced by Parties: a) environmental integrity is considered part of the 
environmental pillar of sustainable development, which is a national prerogative of the Parties; b) the mandate in 
Art. 6(2) and Decision 1/CP.21 is limited to developing and recommending guidance on accounting; c) defining 
environmental integrity is not feasible given conceptual difficulties and the heterogeneity of NDCs, see ASIAN 
DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB), supra note 182, at 10. 
256  Id., at 10. 
257  See, e.g., options A and C in para. 12 of UNFCCC, Joint Reflections Note Addendum 2, supra, note 166; 
UNFCCC, The Katowice Texts, supra note 171, at para. 1, with various bracketed elements according to whch 
ITMOs are to be “[real] [verified] [additional] [and permanent].” 
258  See, e.g., UNFCCC, Joint Reflections Note Addendum 2, supra, note 166, at paras. 8-11. By contrast, UNFCCC, 
The Katowice Texts, supra note 171, at para. 1 is more flexible in stating that ITMOs “are to … [b]e measured in 
metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) in accordance with the methodologies and common metrics 
assessed by the IPCC and adopted by the CMA and/or in other metrics determined by the participating Parties 
consistent with the (national determined contributions (NDCs) of the participating Parties”. 
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actual emissions on the creation, transfer, acquisition, and carry-over of ITMOs,259 or automatic 
cancellation or discounting of emission reductions by a set percentage to ensure achievement of 
“overall mitigation”.260 The latest textual proposal of the Katowice Presidency omitted much of 
the language found in earlier drafts related to such safeguards and limits, yet its failure to secure 
consensus during the climate summit showed that concerns about environmental integrity remain 
important to many Parties. Going forward, the discussion about safeguards and limits is therefore 
likely to remain contentious.261 
Of these safeguards, the definition of uniform or standardized ITMO metrics – which has 
also been referred to as “unitization” or “commodification” of ITMOs262 – is of particular interest, 
because existence of a fungible and well-defined tradable unit can facilitate the creation of larger 
and more liquid carbon market.263 It bears noting, however, that the wording of Article 6(2) does 
not require or mandate such standardization, or mention any specific metric (such as metric tons 
of CO2 equivalent, or tCO2e). Absent a uniformly defined metric, ITMOs can potentially be 
measured in a wide variety of ways, including non-GHG metrics such as Megawatt-hours (MWhs) 
of renewable energy, which then have to be converted before they can be accounted for against 
inventories.264 The latest textual proposals seem to opt against mandatory and uniform metrics, 
stating instead that ITMOs are to be “measured in metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent 
(CO2e) in accordance with the methodologies and common metrics assessed by the IPCC and 
adopted by the CMA and/or in other metrics determined by the participating Parties consistent 
with the national determined contributions (NDCs).”265 And yet, it stands to reason that not all 
Party views are reflected in this textual proposal: Brazil, for instance, has indicated that it only 
considers units with well-defined environmental characteristics and which have emerged from 
NDCs quantified into a budget to be valid ITMOs. 266  Hence, this question is still pending 
resolution in final guidance on Article 6(2), and the consequences of alternative options still need 
to be better understood.267 
                                                 
259  UNFCCC, Joint Reflections Note Addendum 2, supra, note 166, at paras. 103-115; the later textual proposal 
issued by the Presidency of the Katowice climate summit defers the definition of safeguards and limits to a later 
point in time, but mentions a catalogue of options in the proposed draft decision that would have accompanied 
guidance, see UNFCCC, The Katowice Texts, supra note 171, at para. 38, and para. 2 of the Draft CMA Decision 
on Guidance on Cooperative Approaches Referred to in Article 6, Paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, in The 
Katowice Texts: Proposal by the President (Dec. 14, 2018), 31-32, 
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Katowice%20text%2C%2014%20Dec2018_1015AM.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
260  UNFCCC, Joint Reflections Note Addendum 2, supra, note 166, at paras. 116-117. In the later textual proposal of 
the Katowice climate summit Presidency, such “voluntary cancellation or setting aside of ITMOs” by Parties is 
merely “encouraged” to “deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions”, see UNFCCC, The Katowice Texts, 
supra note 171, at para. 8. For general details, see HOWARD, supra note 3, at 19; La Hoz Theuer, Schneider, & 
Broekhoff, supra note 28; KREIBICH & HERMWILLE, supra note 26. 
261 MARCU & RAMBHAROS, supra note 178, at 19–20. 
262  ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB), supra note 182, at 16. 
263  Id., at 16. 
264  Howard, supra note 12, at 185. 
265  UNFCCC, The Katowice Texts, supra note 171, at para. 1. 
266  See Brazil, Views of Brazil, supra, note 237. 
267  YAMIDE DAGNET ET AL., SETTING THE PARIS AGREEMENT IN MOTION: KEY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 
IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES 29 (2018), https://www.wri.org/publication/pact-implementing-guidelines (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2019). 
 40 
Several options in the latest negotiating proposals also relate to the definition and 
expression of NDCs.268 With the decentralized approach introduced by the Paris Agreement, 
Parties enjoy significant leeway in defining their NDCs, and they have chosen to exercise this 
flexibility.269 NDCs submitted to date therefore display considerable diversity in terms of scope, 
type, metrics, and time frames,270 making it harder to compare contributions, assess individual as 
well as collective progress, and account for ITMOs.271 Focusing on the relevance of NDC features 
for environmental integrity, several Parties have proposed limitations on the scope of eligible 
mitigation outcomes, for instance regarding the eligible types of underlying activities (emission 
reductions, removals, emissions avoided, or a broader spectrum of mitigation outcomes),272 or 
restrictions on participation in cooperative approaches based on the properties of NDCs, such as 
the sectoral coverage (economy-wide vs. specific sectors only), timing (single-year vs. multi-year), 
or the quantification of emissions and expression of mitigation targets in absolute terms.273 One 
option that has been proposed in the negotiations involves a requirement for Parties desiring to 
transfer ITMOs from sectors that are not covered by their NDC to expand the latter so it 
encompasses that sector; a similar requirement could be imposed on ITMOs stemming from 
sectors subject to the conditional part of an NDC, mandating that these transition to the 
unconditional part of the NDC.274 
Inclusion of any of these requirements – individually or in combination – in the final 
guidance document would have considerable implications for the scope of eligible transfers under 
Article 6(2). While such requirements would reduce risks to environmental integrity,275 they would 
also mark a departure from the flexible and decentralized architecture of the Paris Agreement. 
Quantitative limits to ITMO transfers, especially absolute limits, can be an effective means of 
limiting transfers of large amounts of “hot air”,276 but simultaneously curtail the ability to use 
cooperative approaches and leverage the economic – and, potentially, environmental – benefits 
they offer.277 Unsurprisingly, therefore, several Parties strongly oppose imposing any type of 
                                                 
268  See, e.g., UNFCCC, Joint Reflections Note Addendum 2, supra, note 166, para. 105; UNFCCC, The Katowice 
Texts, supra note 171, at paras. 12-17. 
269  KREIBICH, supra note 12, at 12. 
270  For instance, some NDCs use a single-year target, while others use multiyear targets; whereas GHG targets in 
different NDCs variously refer to a base year, intensity, baseline scenario, trajectory, or fixed-level targets, see 
DAGNET ET AL., supra note 268, at 29. Generally JAKOB GRAICHEN, MARTIN CAMES & LAMBERT SCHNEIDER, 
CATEGORIZATION OF INDCS IN THE LIGHT OF ART. 6 OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT (2016), 
https://www.dehst.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/projektmechanismen/Categorization_of_INDCs_Paris_agree
ment_discussion_paper.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2019). 
271  CHRISTINA HOOD, GREGORY BRINER & MARCELO ROCHA, GHG OR NOT GHG: ACCOUNTING FOR DIVERSE 
MITIGATION CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE POST-2020 CLIMATE FRAMEWORK (2014), https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/environment/ghg-or-not-ghg_5js1qf652kd3-en (last visited Mar. 13, 2019); HOWARD, supra note 3, 
at 191. 
272  UNFCCC, Joint Reflections Note Addendum 2, supra, note 166, para. 11. The later proposal compiled by the 
climate summit Presidency omits any such specification, see UNFCCC, The Katowice Texts, supra note 171, at 
para. 1.  
273  Brazil, for instance, has suggested limiting eligibility to Parties with quantified absolute reduction targets, see 
Brazil, Views of Brazil, supra, note 237. For reflection of such participation requirements and responsibilities in 
the latest textual proposal, see UNFCCC, Joint Reflections Note Addendum 2, supra, note 166, paras. 33-39. The 
Katowice Presidency proposal is less detailed, merely offering some accounting guidance for different types of 
NDCs, see UNFCCC, The Katowice Texts, supra note 171, at paras. 12-17. 
274  Ahlberg, supra note 24, at 25. 
275  KREIBICH, supra note 12. 
276  Schneider & La Hoz Theuer, supra note 26, at 395. 
277  SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 26. 
 41 
restrictions on the participation in cooperative approaches and on the use of ITMOs, regardless of 
the type of NDCs.278 Requiring that NDCs be quantifiable and quantified, meanwhile, has been 
likened to the creation of carbon budgets, which likewise is rejected by some as a return to the 
centralized governance approach of the Kyoto Protocol.279 As evidenced by the latest textual 
proposals discussed during the Katowice climate summit, support for qualitative or quantitative 
restrictions appears to be limited, with guidance leaving options such as overall mitigation of 
emissions a voluntary choice of Parties.280 Still, these textual proposals are not the final expression 
of Party consensus, and positions may still change before final guidance on Article 6(2) is 
concluded. 
c. Accounting and Transparency 
Given the explicit wording of Article 6(2) and the decision accompanying the Paris Agreement, 
there is no real debate that the mandate to adopt guidance extends, at a minimum, to accounting 
provisions, including corresponding adjustments, that are needed to avoid double counting. What 
“robust accounting” – as required under Article 6(2) – entails, is a process to reflect any transfer 
of ITMOs in the accounting of NDCs.281 Howard identifies several elements that are required for 
robust accounting, and which guidance under Article 6(2) may need to address: a) the definition 
of targets, in particular with regard to the metrics used, the scope of emissions sources, the 
timeframes covered, and the conditionality of the targets; b) the quantification of emission 
reductions, including relevant features such as baselines, global warming potentials (GWP), and 
other aspects of MRV, as well as measures to ensure reductions are not issued more than once; c) 
the tracking of transfers of mitigation outcomes, in particular with regard to the metric used, the 
unique identification of mitigation outcomes,282 and the systems within which they are transferred 
and tracked; and d) the adjustments made in relation to inventory emissions or emission budgets, 
in particular how these map on to transfers between countries and across NDC cycles, how they 
take account of reductions inside and outside the scope of NDCs, and how these address 
differences between single and multi-year targets.283 
Corresponding adjustments are a critical element of the accounting system for Article 6(2), 
as they ensure that an ITMO transfer is reflected accurately on both sides of the transaction,284 
reflecting the double entry bookkeeping approach already deployed under the Kyoto Protocol.285 
Although conceptually straightforward – corresponding adjustments can be effected in various 
ways, including budget-based, emissions-based, buffer registry based, and emission reduction 
based approaches286 – they have prompted challenging questions in the negotiations, for instance 
as regards ITMO transfers that cannot be readily converted into a budget. Given the diversity of 
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NDCs, the latest textual proposals have followed a flexible approach based on an emissions 
balance system.287  
Elaboration of rules on accounting for NDCs is also part a work program under Article 
4(13) of the Paris Agreement,288 however, and accounting for ITMOs will invariable have a 
bearing on the enhanced transparency framework being operationalized under Article 13. Among 
proponents of stringent accounting and transparency rules for Article 6, there has therefore been 
debate as to where transparency and reporting rules related to cooperative approaches should be 
situated. While some argue that these should be drafted and included in the context of guidance 
for Article 6(2), others contend that such rules should be added to the enhanced transparency 
framework under Article 13, given that Article 6 negotiators may lack the necessary expertise to 
draft transparency rules themselves, and that doing so could endanger the coherence between the 
different articles in the Paris Agreement.289 Lacking progress on Article 6 negotiations during the 
Katowice climate summit appears to have tilted preferences towards the latter option, with the 
modalities, procedures and guidelines adopted for Article 13 including minimum reporting 
requirements on the use of cooperative approaches and corresponding adjustments.290 
That may also strengthen the view held by some Parties that no additional transparency 
provisions are required for Article 6(2), given that Parties will hold each other accountable for 
observing mutually agreed criteria and ensuring transparency in their reciprocal activities, while 
upholding transparency vis-a-vis the international community through the enhanced transparency 
framework.291 Still, it bears noting that the latest negotiating text for guidance on Article 6(2) also 
proposed detailed reporting obligations for Parties and would have submitted the reports to a 
dedicated technical expert review, 292  evidencing further political support for stringent 
transparency requirements where it may be lacking for substantive safeguards and limits. 
3. Interim Conclusions 
With a considerable number of options left unresolved or lacking political support in the latest 
textual proposals, negotiators face several difficult choices as they progress towards the next 
climate summit in Santiago, Chile in December 2019. Party statements and submissions ahead of 
the Katowice climate summit already suggested that the distance between opposing views on 
issues related to ambition and flexibility in Article 6(2) guidance remained large, and that observed 
divergence ultimately proved too large to bridge before the end of COP24. As such, therefore, 
insights from scholarly research remain relevant, and can offer useful insights for negotiators as 
these resume their substantive deliberations in pursuit of a more successful outcome than that 
experienced in Katowice.  
One clear insight can be derived from the legal analysis described in the preceding section: 
outlier positions on the role of ambition and environmental integrity in Article 6(2) guidance – 
namely those suggesting that relevant considerations should be either entirely excluded from, or a 
central focus of, such guidance – are not supported by an interpretation of the provision in its 
regulatory context and in light of the object and purpose of the Paris Agreement. Beyond that, 
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however, the textual interpretation offers few parameters. In that regulatory void, theory and 
experience with actual carbon markets can offer some broad insights, but only limited guidance 
on specific options.  
These insights were already summarized above in Section II.C., and they can now be 
translated to the context of Article 6(2). In particular, they caution against shifting what should be 
deliberation about a political issue – the appropriate level of national mitigation pledges – from 
political to technical negotiations. As mentioned earlier, any attempt to address insufficient 
ambition of NDCs with technical restrictions or quantity and quality limits on ITMO transfers may 
reduce the incidence or probability of transfers with questionable environmental integrity in the 
short term; by introducing uncertainty and additional transaction costs, however, it may also 
become a deterrent to use of cooperative approaches. Where restrictions take the form of quantity 
limits, moreover, they will proportionally reduce the scope for cost savings. In the long term, as 
the role of economic cost gains progressive importance, such effects can persist even after matters 
of ambition have been addressed through processes and rules pertaining to NDCs and the ambition 
mechanism of the Paris Agreement. Restrictions should therefore be imposed with caution, and 
potentially limited in scope and duration. 
For those same reasons, oversight arrangements included in guidance on Article 6(2) 
should avoid setting out overly complex procedures and, in particular, an individual approval 
requirement for ITMOs or their transfer. While a governance framework that ensures robust 
accounting and prevents fraudulent market behavior is essential to ensure market functioning and 
credibility for its participants and the broader public, experience with the CDM also suggests that 
necessary safeguards should be streamlined and, where possible, standardized. In fact, common 
definitions and metrics, including a pathway towards a uniform understanding of ITMOs as well 
as a shared infrastructure, could greatly increase the prospects of linked climate policies293 and, 
eventually, of a global carbon market. As observed under the EU ETS, moreover, a mature and 
liquid market relies on diversity of participation, arguing against excessive restrictions on market 
access and in favor of a role for private entities – a decision that would also be in line with the 
expanded recognition of non-Party Stakeholders and their contribution to climate action under the 
Paris Agreement.294 
Overall, given the mixed track record of quality restrictions under the CDM – with over a 
decade of reforms still unable to guarantee the additionality of mitigation projects295 – and the 
invariable tradeoffs incurred by quantity restrictions, a legitimate question arises as to whether 
guidance on Article 6(2) should altogether avoid setting out rules on environmental integrity that 
go beyond robust accounting. While the latest textual proposals discussed in Katowice in 
December 2019 are likely to see continued evolution in the ongoing negotiations, the preference 
for transparency over substantive restrictions reflected therein aligns well with these insights from 
theory and previous practice. Not only is such a limited scope more securely based on the legal 
mandate contained in Article 6(2), reducing the likelihood of Parties subsequently challenging the 
validity or applicability of operational guidance, but it would also seem better aligned with the 
facilitative rather than prescriptive nature of the Paris Agreement itself.  
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Mutual review and scrutiny, facilitated by the enhanced transparency framework and 
potentially also drawing on voluntary initiatives and standards,296 may offer a more fitting solution 
that limits environmentally questionable transfers while retaining the flexibility and scale needed 
to fully leverage the economic benefits of carbon trading. More importantly, the appropriate level 
of ambition is, ultimately, a political question, and any centrally agreed prescriptions should 
therefore avoid taking the form of technical guidance if they are to find broad acceptance and 
eventual practice. That argues for locating questions of adequate baseline definition and avoidance 
of “hot air” in the PAWP negotiations on matters related to Articles 4 and 14 of the Paris 
Agreement, rather than in operational details for a specific instrument, namely ITMO transfers 
under Article 6(2). 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND OUTLOOK  
A. Reducing Flexibility to Enhance Ambition? 
Article 6(2) presents climate negotiators with a perplexing challenge. On the one hand, the 
opportunity to engage in voluntary cooperation involving the transfer of ITMOs promises to reduce 
the economic cost of Parties striving to achieve their NDCs. As the scale and depth of climate 
action – and by extension its attendant costs – increase over time, such flexibility offers a potential 
channel to lower political barriers against greater climate ambition and achieve greater abatement 
with available resources. At the same time, absent essential safeguards, the use of cooperative 
approaches could undermine rather than bolster overall mitigation efforts. Both theory and 
experience highlight the importance of governance frameworks to ensure that market instruments 
for environmental policy function as they should, safeguarding the rights of market participants 
and stakeholders, ensuring transparency in the market, and preventing abusive behavior. 
In the case of carbon markets, however, the role of governance goes well beyond a 
supporting framework: the very commodity traded in the market is a regulatory artifice, and its 
value therefore dependent on the scarcity induced by a political decision to limit GHG emissions. 
Without robust mitigation targets, carbon markets have proven susceptible to numerous 
challenges, including price extremes, high volatility, and eroding confidence among market 
participants and the broader public. A political decision creates the market, in other words, and 
continued governance is critical to sustain it. Ignoring that important lesson threatens to repeat a 
series of painful episodes in existing carbon markets that incurred significant reputational damage 
and destruction of value, all while also weakening their environmental performance. 
That said, regulation of markets tends to increase transaction costs, and can go so far as to 
compromise the ability of market forces to identify the most efficient allocation of resources. In 
the case of carbon markets, restrictions that exceed what is needed to ensure efficient and secure 
market operation can prevent the market from allocating abatement effort to where they can 
achieve the greatest mitigation outcome. To the extent that reduced costs can create political and 
economic leeway for greater ambition, any regulatory intervention that stifles market activity can, 
conversely, prevent the progression of effort needed to address the climate challenge. Ironically, 
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both a regulatory framework that is too weak and one that is too restrictive will stand in the way 
of harnessing those very benefits that prompted introduction of a  market-based approach in the 
first place. In some measure, then, the solution to this predicament lies in identifying a reasonable 
balance between too much and too little regulation. 
Identifying that balance is not straightforward, however. Not all policy interventions are 
created equal, and distinguishing those that are necessary to ensure a functioning governance 
framework from those that are needlessly restrictive is one of the central challenges facing policy 
makers in the operationalization of Article 6(2). Invariably, decisions will end up requiring a 
choice between competing priorities, inviting tradeoffs reflective of subjective preferences. This 
argues for the importance of process over substantive criteria – a process that is fair and 
transparent, and affords all affected stakeholders an opportunity to be heard. For all its undisputed 
shortcomings, the UNFCCC offers such a process, which, although often intensely deliberative 
and painfully slow, delivers legitimate and widely accepted outcomes. Negotiations on Article 6(2) 
have exemplified this core strength of multilateralism, facilitating an inclusive dialogue that has 
actively engaged Parties through workshops and other activities, and that has also been open to 
inputs from non-Party stakeholders. 
But while the legitimacy of political decisions may stem primarily from their reflection of 
aggregated consensus or majority opinion and, to a lesser degree, the underlying process, it can 
also be strengthened when the outcomes are informed by data, research, and empirical evidence. 
That is also the channel through which this article seeks to contribute. As shown in the preceding 
sections, both theory and practice hold valuable lessons for Parties seeking the right balance 
between ambition and flexibility in the governance of Article 6(2). Aside from a suitably robust 
mitigation objective – the indispensable starting point of a functioning carbon market – the 
applicable governance framework has to protect the rights and enforce the obligations of market 
participants; ensure transparency of emissions and of market activity; provide the necessary 
infrastructure for transactions; and offer effective safeguards against fraud and manipulation. 
Adoption of a regulatory framework that affords these governance features is thus not a 
question of “whether”, but of “how”. Still, government regulation is not free of its own 
shortcomings. Even just implementing these essential rules and procedures will reveal the 
government failures that affect all policy making due to information asymmetries, administrative 
capacity constraints, and regulatory capture. But again, an abundant and growing body of literature 
on the design and operation of carbon markets offers various lessons for policy makers to consider. 
What theory and experience likewise confirm, is that every additional policy restriction beyond 
these necessary governance features will increase the incidence of government failure, and 
counteract the benefits of addressing the initial market failure. Perhaps most clearly, this has been 
in evidence under the CDM, where participation in the carbon market has been dependent on a 
lengthy and complex approval process, as well as subject to detailed and continuously adjusted – 
yet ultimately still inadequate – rules on the additionality of mitigation projects.297 
Two insights stand out, in particular: first, when the governance framework of carbon 
markets becomes so complex as to constrain all flexibility of market participants, the market ceases 
to function as it should, and begins to resemble the rigid performance and technology standards 
whose high cost prompted the transition to a market approach in the first place.298 Second, when 
the political decision that lies at the foundation of the carbon market – the mitigation objective – 
lacks necessary ambition, it is both inefficient and, arguably, of doubtful legitimacy to try and 
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secure greater ambition through technical design elements. Faced with such a situation, policy 
makers may need to ask themselves whether a market approach is the right instrument for the 
desired task, and whether the desired task is supported by the body politic. Attempting to 
circumvent the political process to recalibrate the equation of ambition and flexibility through 
technical or administrative means is unlikely to lead to a durable outcome. 
Applied to Article 6(2) and the guidance being elaborated for its operationalization, there 
are a number of insights to be garnered from theory and experience. As the legal analysis – 
including application of the customary rules of treaty interpretation – affirm, the mandate in Article 
6(2) neither requires Parties to include aspects related to ambition in future guidance, nor does it 
prevent them from doing so. Ambition and environmental integrity are sufficiently prevalent 
throughout the Paris Agreement to be considered part of its object and purpose, supporting calls 
of Parties and observers for guidance to extend beyond mere aspects of “robust accounting” and 
the prevention of double counting (which a purely textual interpretation might otherwise sustain). 
Still, that by no means equates to an obligation to include additional elements in guidance. Parties 
have considerable latitude when considering the appropriate level of prescription and specificity 
of operational details, and their consistent practice – as expressed in the negotiations of the CMA 
and in subsidiary bodies, as well as the decisions flowing from these processes – are the only 
reliable benchmark of what guidance on Article 6(2) will and will not contain. 
In the negotiations to date, Parties have proposed widely divergent and at times 
irreconcilable options on governance of cooperative approaches under Article 6(2), including as it 
relates to ambition and environmental integrity. A continuum of views between prescriptiveness 
and flexibility is apparent from the statements and submissions of Parties, and while the latest 
textual proposals discussed during the Katowice climate summit greatly reduced the number of 
options and bracketed text in the interest of achieving a practicable outcome, the fact that it failed 
to secure consensus was evidence that country positions were still too far apart on many central 
issues for an agreement. As Parties resume their deliberations on Article 6(2) guidance, they will 
again be considering all options, including their respective implications and tradeoffs. Insights 
from scholarly research and previous case studies can help inform this process. 
While the analysis carried out in this article does not lend itself to specific 
recommendations, it allows formulating a set of broader principles that can inform the choice 
between alternative options. Based on practical experience with carbon markets, for instance, one 
such recommendation is to keep transaction costs as low as possible by avoiding lengthy 
procedures and individual approval requirements, opting instead for a more streamlined process 
and, where material conditions are unavoidable, standardized rather than individual requirements. 
Consideration should also be given to uniform definitions and metrics for ITMOs, which, while 
perhaps politically unappealing initially for some Parties, could be phased in over time. Such 
common reference points would increase transparency and comparability, and greatly facilitate 
linkage of domestic climate policies over time by allowing for the transfer of what would then be 
fungible units. 
Experience to date has also shown that mature and liquid carbon markets rely on diversity 
of participation. Article 6(2) guidance should therefore avoid excessive restrictions on 
participation in cooperative approaches, and instead consider including opportunities for market 
access by non-Party Stakeholders, including the private sector. Quantity limits, while effective as 
safeguards against transfers of “hot air”, impose a commensurate limit on the economic – and, 
potentially, mitigation – benefits that can be leveraged through use of cooperative approaches, and 
should therefore be used with caution or, alternatively, as a transition mechanism for a limited time 
period. Likewise, given the experience with additionality rules under the CDM, quality restrictions 
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may add transaction costs without necessarily achieving the desired outcome. In particular, 
technical safeguards should not to be thought of as an opportunity to make up for weak NDCs or 
insufficient collective ambition under the Paris Agreement: if anything, such questions call for a 
political decision under the respective elements of the PAWP, such as the work on matters related 
to Articles 4 and 14.  
Because of the potential for regulatory failure caused, for instance, by imperfect 
information and regulatory capture, as well as the inevitable tradeoffs of restrictive procedures and 
substantive requirements, future guidance on Article 6(2) might ultimately achieve a stronger 
environmental outcome if it focuses on providing common metrics and definitions, elaborating a 
robust accounting framework, and ensuring the transparency and integrity of ITMO transfers. Such 
essential rules should ideally be formulated in precise and mandatory terms.299 Where questions 
of ambition are not otherwise dealt with by the Parties, for instance in further guidance related to 
mitigation under Article 4, they may be better addressed through optional or soft guidance, or 
altogether left to the Parties engaged in an ITMO transfer to agree on the balance between 
flexibility and ambition they are most comfortable with. Other channels of quality assurance and 
scrutiny – including voluntary standards and review by non-Party stakeholders – are certain to 
emerge, adding to the incentive of acquiring parties to avoid the acquisition of evidently flawed 
mitigation outcomes. The resulting distribution of technical and political questions, and the 
attendant balance of flexible determination and multilateral prescription, may best reflect the 
delicate equilibrium that also defines the Paris Agreement. It would, finally, also find a solid basis 
in the legal mandate set out in Article 6(2), and thereby offer greater resilience against any future 
challenges that the guidance exceeds that mandate or is otherwise not aligned with the Paris 
Agreement.  
In sum, the foregoing analysis affirms that: a) ambition can feature as a consideration in the 
guidance, even if the language of the Paris Agreement in Article 6(2) does not dictate a specific 
threshold or material outcome; b) the Paris Agreement pursues ambition as a goal, and is at the 
same time committed to a decentralized architecture that favors national determination by 
sovereign Parties; c) it is up to Parties negotiating operational details for Article 6(2) to agree on 
the appropriate balance between more prescriptive guidance that promotes ambition, and more 
flexible guidance that seeks to contain transaction costs and allow access for a greater number of 
participants; d) any acceptable compromise will fall somewhere between prescriptiveness and 
flexibility, reflecting the same balance that defines the Paris Agreement, and also the observation 
that neither completely unregulated nor excessively regulated markets are efficient, or indeed 
conducive to greater ambition; e) the elements of such a compromise should be negotiated in the 
appropriate forum, and guidance elaborated under the auspices of a more technical body (such as 
SBSTA) should not seek to supplant or correct political decisions on ambition and flexibility 
reached in a political forum (such as the CMA or APA). 
B. Common Principles for Guidance on Article 6(2) 
 Carbon trading theory and experience affirm the need for robust governance in certain 
matters, such as transparency of emissions, accurate accounting of transfers, as well as 
avoidance of market power and abuse; 
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 Theory and experience also highlight the need to avoid an overly restrictive governance 
framework with high transaction costs, investor risk, and uncertain benefits, such as 
individual approval of ITMOs and transfers; 
 Caution should be exercised when seeking to regulate environmental integrity risks, as 
different governance responses have suffered from their own failures, such as information 
asymmetries, capacity constraints, or regulatory capture; 
 Some issues may defy a regulatory solution. Additionality tests, for instance, have failed to 
guarantee the additionality of mitigation projects despite a decade of attempts at reform, and 
yet contribute to transaction costs and project risk; 
 Other restrictions, such as quantity limits on transfers, will proportionally curtail the 
economic benefits of trading, and thus impose commensurate limits on any potential cost 
savings and increased ambition these might allow; 
 Some concerns may also be misplaced, such as those about a dynamic incentive of Parties to 
weaken future mitigation pledges, where empirical data confirms that domestic politics and 
institutional power structures are the decisive factors; 
 Hence, guidance should focus on essential governance aspects such as common definitions, 
accounting, and oversight of market integrity, employing precise language and – where 
appropriate – mandatory terms; 
 For other issues that merely might benefit from coordination, optional and aspirational terms 
may be preferable to safeguard the flexibility of Parties and ensure that markets can allocate 
resources efficiently; 
 This includes participation or eligibility requirements, where allowing access to private 
entities can greatly increase market activity, liquidity, and efficient price discovery, as shown 
by the experiences with existing carbon markets; 
 Standardization of metrics and other parameters of ITMOs may help streamline cooperative 
approaches and increase fungibility of traded units, potentially accelerating the emergence 
of a global carbon market with greater cost savings; 
 Although ambition is not mentioned in Article 6(2), the broader context of that provision as 
well as the object and purpose of the Paris Agreement allow for its consideration in Article 
6(2) guidance; 
 Still, lacking ambition of NDCs should not be compensated with greater restrictions on 
cooperative approaches, as this may impede their future uptake even if NDCs are eventually 
strengthened; 
 Instead, political questions related to overall ambition and ambition of individual NDCs 
require political deliberation at the appropriate level and in relevant elements of the PAWP 
to secure enduring acceptance and legitimacy; 
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 Guidance that thus reflects the multiple balancing acts struck in the Paris Agreement will 
also find a solid basis in the negotiating mandate of Article 6(2), and offer greater resilience 
against any future legal challenges. 
 
 
 
